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RESTORING THE SUBSTANCE TO THE SOUL OF PSYCHOLOGY

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Currently, the self has replaced the soul as the major focus of much psychological theorizing. I argue that this shift is due to a number of confusions regarding the nature and justification of substance dualism. I also claim that this focus on the self, without a framework that treats it as a substantial soul, leads to a number of conceptual problems and terminological equivocations. Moreover, I show that certain features of widely accepted views of the self actually seem to require a substantial soul to make sense. To substantiate these claims, Section I contains a discussion of a set of current misunderstandings about the nature of a substance (e.g., that a substance is a static thing unrelated to other things), and a treatment of key problems with current models of the self (e.g., that the self is a construct of language). Section II compares two very different views of wholes with parts-substances vs. property-things. Section III clarifies the essence of substance dualism by describing five states of the soul and the nature of a faculty of the soul. The section closes with a sketch of the main types of considerations that justify belief in substance dualism. In the final section, I argue that the self is the soul by showing how key features of certain psychological models of the self seem to require substance dualism to make sense and by clarifying a set of psychological terms/concepts in light of what has been argued earlier.

It is almost boorish to mention that, etymologically, psychology is the study of the *psyche,* the soul. Still, the etymology is a fact and a revealing one at that because, given that the etymology expresses what at least some psychologists used to take themselves to study, it raises three pressing questions for contemporary psychology. First, in light of the ubiquitous absence of the term *soul* in modern psychology, just what is it that psychologists investigate anyway? Second, given an answer to the first question, exactly how did it, for example, the self, come to replace the soul as the proper object of psychological study? Third, what are the implications for psychology of this shift in emphasis?

At least three reasons indicate the importance of answering these questions and, more generally, of re-appropriating a substantial soul in psychological models and therapeutic interventions. First, there is a tendency for psychologists to reduce the patient as a whole to a set of functions or structures with the result that it is hard to recapture the centrality of the unity of the human person and the existence of genuine agency. Second, there is also a tendency to reduce the human person to his or her brain and to replace the psychologist with the psychiatrist. A proper understanding of the substantial soul brings to center stage the fundamental importance and irreducibility (or irreplaceability) of distinctively psychological explanations and models. Finally, as Jeffrey H. Boyd (1994) has argued, a reclamation of a substantial soul in psychology provides more fertile ground for the integration of psychology and theology.

Returning to the three questions listed above, in my view, the answer to the question of what it is that psychologists investigate is that they explore and work with the self, or so at least many psychologists would assert. Psychology now studies the nature, development, and functioning of the self. The self has replaced the soul. The full answer to the second question is too complicated to treat here, but part of the reason that the self came to replace the soul as the proper object of psychological study is the pervasive confusion surrounding what it means to say that the soul is an immaterial substance, along with the loathing for substance dualism characteristic of the academy. It is the loss of the idea of a substance and its correct conceptualization that is the main culprit in this transition. Without a correct conceptualiza-

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tion, psychologists and others who deal with the nature of human kind will, sooner or later, run up against an inadequate framework for treating human persons as they actually are. Finally, my answer to the third question is that there is widespread confusion on the part of at least some psychologists regarding the nature of the self (cf. Levin, 1992; Smith, 1978).

In what follows, I shall unpack these terse remarks by (a) drawing attention to some of the current confusion that peppers psychological literature, (b) explaining what a substance is, (c) offering a brief sketch of the types of considerations relevant to justifying the claim that the self is an immaterial substance called a soul, and (d) applying the insights surfaced in sections II and III to the confusions mentioned in section I. As a Christian philosopher with a deep respect for psychology in general, and Christian psychology in particular, I hope to offer some useful distinctions and arguments to my psychological colleagues who are trying to develop more cogent models of the self and integrate those models with theology.

I. Confusions Regarding the Nature of a Substance and the Self

Historically and biblically, Christianity has held to a dualist notion of the human being. A human being is a unity of two distinct entitles—body and soul (cf. Cooper, 1989; Hasker, 1995, Moreland, 1995; Moreland & Wallace, 1995). The soul, while not by nature immortal, is nevertheless, capable of entering an intermediate disembodied state upon death and, eventually, being reunited with a resurrected body. The name for this view is substance dualism. On this view, the soul or "I" is a substantial, unified reality that informs and causally interacts with its body and that contains various mental states within it—for example, sensations, thoughts, beliefs, desires, and acts of will.

Confusions About the Nature of a Substance

Central to the Christian conception of a human person is the notion of a substance. However, currently, there are certain misunderstandings about the nature of a substance that plague various depictions of what that notion entails, and these misunderstandings cloud the correct appropriation of the classical Christian understanding. First, some think that a substance is simple and inert. If a substance is simple, then it is totally uncomposed; it has no internal differentiation whatsoever of properties or parts within it. Thus, if a substance is simple and we find human persons to be capable of fragmentation (e.g., multiple personalities), then it would follow that they are not substances. Fortunately, the proper view of a substance does not require us to treat it as a simple entity. As we will see later, the idea that a substance is simple in that it has no parts is a confusion rooted in the acceptance of only separable parts (e.g., the various legs of a table) and an eschewal of what are sometimes called inseparable parts (e.g., the various faculties of the soul). On this view, if two parts cannot be separated from each other and still exist (as can the table legs), then the two parts (e.g., the affective vs. the volitional faculties) are really the same thing.

Speaking of the holistic concept of a person, J. K. Howard (1970) claimed that "it is possible to distinguish between [the] activities [of a person], but we cannot distinguish between the parts, for they have no independent existence" (p. 74). Howard went on to claim that while we can study the whole person from various points of view (e.g., cognition, memory, affect), in reality these are not genuinely distinct from each other because they are not separable (Howard, pp. 70, 75-76). Apparently, for Howard, to exist is to be capable of separable existence. Thus, if the different activities (e.g., affective, cognitive, volitional) of a person are incapable of being separated from the whole person and still exist, then they do not exist as real, different activities. Moreover, if we take the person to be a substance, and this means that the person is a simple entity, then the person must also be viewed as an inert individual atom because a simple object has no internal capacities for change.

A second confusion about substances is that a substance is mistakenly taken to be a static, nonrelational individual. J. D. Zizioulas (1975) claimed that if we take the person to be a substance then we turn that person into a self-contained, bounded atom unrelated to others (pp. 403-415; cf. Zizioulas, 1985, pp. 27-49). Along similar lines, Francis L. K. Hsu (1985) opined that the Western, substantial concept of the person is problematic because it pictures personality "as a separate entity distinct from society and culture.... Since personality is seen as a distinct entity, there is an inevitable failure to come to terms with the reality of man" (p. 25). Later, when we look in more detail at the nature of substance, we will see how inadequate these statements are. But for now, it should be pointed out that, historically, substances have been understood to contain a rich diversity of potentialities for change within them, as well as the ability to be related to various other things according to their natures.

A third muddle about the nature of substance is that it is a useless notion that has been replaced by the concept of a structure or a system in our theoretical constructions of the human person, especially the self.[1] Meissner (1993) noted that for many psychoanalytic theorists, the self is "a form of psychic structure defined as such by its functions" (p. 464). On this view, the self is not a substantial thing with a structure; rather, it is itself a system, an organization, a structure. Meissner went on to note that some psychologists take this position to be a contrast to a view of the self expressed in "a mystical or vitalistic model" (p. 476). Apparently, the self-as-substance position is supposed to be mired in mysticism or vitalism.

Problems with Current Models of the Self

Besides these three confusions about the nature of substance itself, there are at least four problem areas of disarray associated with recent psychological models of the self. The first one is the lack of uniform agreement about a set of distinctions associated with discussions of the self. For example, some hold the self to be an aggregate of self representations, especially of the experience-near concept of self-representations, while others take a more ontological approach to the self and view it as a structural entity containing a variety of subsystems. Again, Stephen A. Mitchell (1991) seemed to conflate the nature of the self and the person's self definition (p. 131-135). For Mitchell, the self, as an existent reality with its own nature, just is, whatever particular definition the individual self (!) gives to itself. Since, for Mitchell, self-definition always implies comparison and contrast with others, the self just is a set of interpersonal relations, rather than being something that exists and, then, enters into various relations in various sorts of ways. Finally, there seems to be no clear consensus about how to take the following notions which I shall place into two groups: group 1—becoming a self, being a self, developing as a self, selfhood; group 2—self awareness, awareness of the self as a self, self image, self concept, self representation, having a conception of the self. Later I shall try to sort out these notions and recommend a distinct usage for each. I will argue that group 1 contains ontological notions and group 2 includes epistemological ones.

Besides these areas of disagreement or confusion, a second problematic feature of theories about the self is expressed by Stephen Mitchell's (1991) observation that there is a difficulty, perhaps an insuperable one, in harmonizing two seemingly discordant portraits of the self: the self as relational, multiple, and discontinuous versus the self as separate from others, integral, and continuous (pp. 126-140). Mitchell does not really resolve this tension (apart from comparing the tension to a supposedly unproblematic example, viz., cinematic film which simultaneously has discontinuous pictures that seem to a third person observer to be continuous). Instead, he simply acknowledged that in the analytic process, experiences of self in both senses arise and must be held in creative tension. Unfortunately, his deliberations on this tension betray an inadequate recognition of the distinction between the self itself (an ontological notion) and a person's experience of the self (an epistemological notion), and Mitchell reduced the former to the latter (Mitchell, 1991, p. 140; 1993, pp. 114-115).

Focusing on the self itself (an ontological notion), if it really is relational, multiple, and discontinuous, leaves simply no room for personal agency in one's model of the self because the self becomes a stream of events taken as passive occurrences caused by prior events going back to a time before the individual was born. Personal actions take time and only if there is a unified, enduring self can robust personal agency be affirmed. Typical free acts take time and an enduring agent is what gives unity to such acts by being the same self who is present at the beginning of the action as intentional agent who originates action, during the act as teleological guider of means to ends, and at the end as responsible actor. Thus, the discontinuous model of the self fails to allow room for important features of the self captured by the integral, continuous view. But the converse holds only on a mistaken view of the self as a substance. On a correct depiction, one can take the substantial self as a separate, integrated, continuous unity and still allow for the reality of all those psychological features of the self sometimes taken to require the discontinuous position.

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[1] I am interested here in theorists who describe the self as a system or structure. However, this same description is sometimes applied to the ego. Thus, Redfearn (1987) described Hartmann and others for whom the ego is defined as "a system of adaptive and integrated functions hierarchically arranged" (p. 392).

Third, Brewster-Smith (1987), Young-Eisendrath and Hall (1987), and Cushman (1990) have all embraced the view that the self is a construct of language, a reification of the first person pronoun "I" and, that, as such, the self is a culturally relative, historically conditioned construct. Curiously, Cushman asserted that "there is no universal, transhistorical self, only local selves; no universal theory about the self, only local theories" (p. 599). What makes this statement odd is that it is self refuting. Cushman's own statement was offered as a transhistorical, universal theory about the self, a fact made evident by reading his article. In any case, these theorists took the self to have no objective ontological status independent of language or culture.

Finally, Broughton (1980) noted that the history of the psychological understanding of the self is a story of the replacement of the self as substance with the self as function. Broughton spoke disparagingly about "the excess baggage of substance" which takes the self to be thing-like. Instead of the substance view, Broughton claimed that modern psychology tends to view the self as an activity or function, or as a bundle of activities or functions. If Broughton was correct in his claim that the self is not thing-like and, rather, must be taken as identical to a set of functions, then certain disastrous implications follow. For example, if the current patient now has a newly acquired set of functions from those exhibited a few years ago, then the patient is literally a completely new individual without a past and it will be irrelevant to ask that patient to own, get in touch with, or otherwise deal with past experiences because those experiences would involve a completely different person!

In order to bring some clarity to these problems and confusions regarding substance and self, we must first examine two very different kinds of wholes: a substance as understood by philosophers like Aristotle and Aquinas, and a property-thing or ordered aggregate. In the process of investigating the metaphysics of substance, we should gain insights into the confusions about substance and self mentioned above.

II. Substances Versus Property-Things (Ordered Aggregates)

In order to understand substance dualism, we first need to grasp the notions of a substance and a property-thing (cf. Connell, 1988; Gilson, 1984; Wiggins, 1980).

A substance is a thing which has or owns properties but is not had by something more basic than it. Second, a substance is a deep, primitive, non-emergent unity at a point in time of parts, properties, and capacities, and it maintains absolute sameness through (accidental) change. By saying that substances have a primitive unity, I mean that substances are wholes that are ontologically prior to their parts in that those parts are what they are in virtue of what the substance is, taken as a whole. Living organisms are paradigm cases of substances according to the traditional view. A chamber of a heart is defined in terms of the heart as a whole, the heart is defined in terms of the circulation system as a whole, and that system is defined in terms of the organism as a whole. The unity of a substance is not something that emerges when a set of parts is somehow placed together to form a structure. It is inherent in the substance, not something that is emergent.

Substances are unities of actual properties, parts, and capacities. A property is a characteristic, an attribute, a quality that a substance has, for example, brownness or being round. More than one substance can have the same property at the same time; for instance, two different dogs can be brown at the same time. In general, if a substance (e.g., one dog) is annihilated, the properties of the substance do not cease to exist and can still be characteristics of another substance. The various features of consciousness, for example, the felt texture of pain or anxiety, the intentionality of our thoughts and beliefs, the raw feel of sensory awareness, are properties.

A part is a particular, individual entity that a substance contains. If a substance is annihilated, its parts cease to exist. Parts come in two kinds: separable, independent parts and inseparable, dependent parts called modes or moments. A separable part is one that can exist on its own outside of the whole of which it is a part. For example, the legs of a table are separable parts. One can break the table apart and set the various legs in different places in the house. A dependent part cannot exist outside of the whole of which it is a part and, thus, is dependent on that whole for its existence. In a round, red spot, the particular instance of roundness and the particular instance of redness are different from each other and from the entire spot of which they are parts. But one could not split the spot apart, as it were, and place the individual instances of redness and roundness in different locations. Later, I will claim that the mind is a dependent part, specifically, a faculty within the soul.

When a substance has a property, we say that the property is exemplified or instanced by the substance. If two dogs are brown, then each dog exemplifies the very same property, brownness, but each dog also has its own instance of brownness. Brownness is a universal property that can be in more than one thing at the same time, but each instance of brown is a particular that is not literally sharable. When a substance exemplifies a property (a dog is brown), the property instance itself (the particular instance of brownness possessed by a specific dog) is an inseparable, dependent part or, to use Edmund Husserl's term, a moment of that substance and, as such, it is to be taken as a mode of the substance internally related to that substance. The mode exists and is what it is in virtue of the substance it modifies. When a chunk of gold is molded into a particular shape, that specific instance of shape is a mode, a dependent part of the chunk of gold. The chunk of gold could exist without having this particular shape, but this specific shape of the chunk of gold could not exist if that chunk of gold were annihilated. In virtue of studying the modes of a substance, along with the parts and properties that constitute them, we gain insight about the essence of the substance so modified.

Third, a substance is a this-such, that is, a particular member of its natural kind which, in turn, constitutes its essence. For example, two dogs are different particular animals with the same nature. The unity and nature of a substance derives from its essence that lies within it, and its parts (e.g., the nose and claws of a dog) stand in internal relations to each other in that if a part is removed from its whole, it loses its identity with itself. As Aristotle said, a severed human hand is, strictly speaking, no longer human, a fact that will become evident in a few days. By studying the essence of a human person, we get at those features of human persons that tell us what is proper or normative for them. Put differently, a thing should mature and develop according to its nature and when this does not happen—for instance, when a child is color blind or has a fragmented sense of self—then this represents a dysfunction, that is, something that ought not be there given the nature of what it is to be a human person. When Paul said that homosexuality is contrary to "nature" (Rom. 1:26), he had essence in mind.

Before we turn to an examination of a property-thing, note carefully that substances are not simples. A simple is something that contains no internal differentiation whatever—no properties or parts that differ from each other and that are internal to the substance. Substances are complex wholes of properties, inseparable parts, and capacities. Since a substance is internally complex and not simple, then there is no a priori reason to think that if the soul is a substance it cannot become functionally fragmented, for example, in multiple personality cases or in split brain phenomena. Only if the soul is a simple entity is functional fragmentation ruled out. Even though, on the traditional view, substances are characterized by a primitive, underived unity and are not composed of separable parts, they are not simples.

Moreover, while a substance like an acorn is what it is independently of the other entities to which it is related, it is nevertheless true that before a substance can grow and mature, it must be appropriately related to the right kind of environment, in this case, the right kind of soil. Just what constitutes the correct types of relationships and environment conducive to maturation will depend upon the nature of the substance in question. Thus, if human persons are substances, they are what they are independently of their relationships to other entities. But it could still be the case (and actually is the case) that, before a human person can grow into a mature, fully-functional being, the person must be appropriately related to the correct physical, psychological, social, and religious environment. So it is incorrect to claim that the substance view of human persons turns them into inert atoms, completely unrelated to others.

Turning to property-things or ordered aggregates, an artifact like a table or automobile is a paradigm case of a property-thing. Property-things derive their unity from an external ordering principle (either in the mind of a designer or from a law of nature) that is imposed from the outside on a set of parts to form the object. A property-thing is structured stuff, that is, parts placed in some type of ordering relation. Put differently, a property-thing is composed of separable parts. In such wholes, the parts are prior to the whole, the whole contains some sort of structural property that supervenes upon those parts (the whole is defined in terms of the parts and the ordering relation; e.g., a table is structured wood), the parts are related to each other by means of external relations, they remain identical to themselves regardless of whether or not they are in the whole property-thing (e.g., a car door is still what it is when detached from a car), and property-things do not maintain strict identity through loss of old parts or properties and gain of new ones.

There are two very different types of structures that characterize substances and property-things. When we say that a substance has a structure, we mean that the substance has an essence, a blueprint containing different properties, parts, and capacities internally related to each other. The structure is not derived from the parts when they are arranged in a certain way. Rather, the structure is what is responsible for the parts and properties coming to be related as they are in the substance; for instance, a fetus or an acorn develops parts and attributes in its species specific sort of way according to the internally related structure that constitutes its essence. The various properties, parts, and capacities of a substance are what they are in virtue of their relations to the substance that possesses them. By contrast, the structure of a property-thing is derived from a set of parts that are placed into some sort of arrangement, and the structure is a set of externally related parts (properties, capacities), for example, geometrically organized parts, such that the parts (properties, capacities) are indifferent to the structure of the derived whole that contains them. The door or spark plugs of a car are externally related to each other and they do not undergo a change when they are removed from the car.

There are three other features of the traditional view of substance that are crucial to our topic. First, as was mentioned above, substances are a unity of capacities. A capacity is a potentiality, a disposition, an ability to have a property or part that is not currently actual. Neither a 1-week old child nor a rose bush can actually do math but the child has the capacity to do math and the rose bush does not. Now, capacities come in hierarchies. There are first-order capacities, second-order capacities to have these first-order capacities, and so on, until ultimate capacities are reached. For example, if I can speak English but not Russian, then I have the first-order capacity for English as well as the second-order capacity to have this first-order capacity (which I have already developed). I also have the second-order capacity to have the capacity to speak Russian, but I lack the first-order capacity to do so.

Higher order capacities are realized by the development of lower order capacities under them. An acorn has the ultimate capacity to draw nourishment from the soil, but this can be actualized and unfolded only by developing the lower capacity to have a root system, then developing the still lower capacities of the root system, and so on. When a substance has a defect (e.g., a child is color blind), it does not lose its ultimate capacities. Rather, it lacks some lower order capacity it needs for the ultimate capacity to be developed. Furthermore, when a substance (e.g., an acorn or fetus) develops, it does not become more of the kind of thing it is (an oak, a human); rather, it matures as that kind of thing. In fact, it is because an acorn or a human fetus is a certain kind of thing throughout its growth processes that maturation proceeds in a certain sequential sort of way appropriate for individuals that fall under that kind. Caterpillars, fetuses, and adolescents are not kinds of things. They are phases or stages in kinds of things.

A substance's capacities culminate in a set of its ultimate capacities that are possessed by it solely in virtue of the substance belonging to its natural kind; for example, Smith's ultimate capacities are his because he belongs to the natural kind, being human. A substance's inner nature is constituted by its ordered structural unity of ultimate capacities. A substance cannot change in its ultimate capacities; that is, it cannot lose its ultimate nature and continue to exist. Smith may replace his skin color from exposure to the sun and still exist, but if he loses his humanness, his inner nature of ultimate capacities that constitutes being human, then Smith ceases to exist.

Second, sometimes properties relate to each other as a genus does to a species. Here are some genus/species relationships: being a color/being red; being a shape/being square; and, according to the traditional view, being a person/being a human. The species is a way by which the genus exists. Being red, square, or human are ways that being colored, shaped, or being a person exist in individual things. There can be colored things that are not red things, but there cannot be red things that are not colored things. Similarly, there can be persons that are not humans (Martians, angels), but there are no humans that are not persons. In fact, there is no such thing as a colored thing or person plain and simply. There are only kinds of colored things (e.g., red things) and kinds of persons (e.g., divine, human, angelic). Thus, in the classic doctrine of substance, there are no such things as human non-persons, such as defective newborns or permanent vegetative state (PVS) patients.

Given these points about the ultimate capacities and inner natures of substances and the notion that personhood is a genus, and without claiming to give a fully adequate definition of a person, we can, nevertheless, offer this general characterization: A person is a certain kind of living entity that has a certain fairly standard set of ultimate capacities (e.g., intellectual, volitional) that constitute its inner nature the way a genus constitutes the nature of a species. A human is a specific kind of person.

Finally, the concept of a substance is relevant to one's understanding of free will and agency. Currently, there are two main philosophical views about the nature of freedom: compatibilism and libertarianism (Rowe, 1991). Compatibilists hold that freedom is compatible with determinism. For them, freedom is acting on one's desires and beliefs even if those desires and beliefs are determined by factors outside the self. It is consistent with compatibilism that the self be a discontinuous series of events or self-stages. Libertarians believe that while desires and beliefs may influence one's choices, they cannot necessitate them if one is to be free. Given the choice to do some act, *e* (e.g., raise one's hand to vote), freedom requires the agent to be a substantial, self-moving subject who has the power to do *e* or to refrain from doing *e* without anything inside or outside the agent changing before either option can be performed. More generally, person *P* exercises libertarian agency, and freely and intentionally brings about some event, *e,* just in case (a) *P* is a substance that has the active power to bring about *e*; (b) *P* exerted his power as a first mover (an originator of change) to bring about *e*; (c) *P* had the categorical ability to refrain from exerting his power to bring about *e*; (d) *P* acted for the sake of a reason which serves as the final cause or teleological goal for which *P* acted. Note that a necessary condition for libertarian freedom and agency is that the actor be a substance.

III. THE SOUL AS AN IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE

For a number of reasons, the most intellectually credible view of the soul is to take it to be an immaterial substance. I cannot offer a detailed defense of this claim here. The issues are too complicated to treat adequately in one section of a journal article. But I want to offer a few thoughts about what I take the soul to be like, followed by a sketch of the types of considerations relevant to a defense of substance dualism (cf. Boyd, 1994; Foster, 1991; Madell, 1988; Moreland, 1993; Robinson, 1993; Swinburne, 1986; Taliaferro, 1994).

The soul is a very complicated thing with an intricate internal structure. In order to understand that structure, we need to grasp two important issues: the different types of states within the soul and the notion of a faculty of the soul. The soul is a substantial, unified reality that informs its body. The soul is to the body like God is to space—it is fully present at each point within the body. Further, the soul and body relate to each other in a cause-effect way. For example, if I worry in my soul, my brain chemistry will change; if I will to raise my arm in my soul, the arm goes up. If I experience brain damage, this can cause me to lose the ability to remember certain things in my soul. Body and soul are highly interactive, they enter into deep causal relations and functional dependencies with each other, and the human person is a unity of both.

States Within the Soul

The soul also contains various mental states within it, for example, sensations and thoughts. This is not as complicated as it sounds. Water can be in a cold or a hot state. Likewise, the soul can be in a feeling or thinking state. There are at least five different states that can take place within the soul: a sensation, a thought, a belief, a desire, a volition. Now the soul contains more states than these five, but it will be helpful to single these out and explain them more fully. A sensation is a state of awareness or sentience, a mode of consciousness (e.g., a conscious awareness of sound, color, or pain). A thought is a mental content that can be expressed in an entire sentence and that only exists while it is being thought. Some thoughts logically imply other thoughts. For example "All dogs are mammals" entails "Some dogs are mammals." Some thoughts don't entail, but merely provide evidence for, other thoughts. For example, certain thoughts about evidence in a court case provide evidence for the thought that a person is guilty. Finally, a thought exists only while someone is having it, and one can have thoughts that one does not believe. A belief is a person's view accepted to varying degrees of strength, of how things really are. At any given time, one can have many beliefs that are not currently being contemplated. A desire is a certain felt inclination to do, have, avoid, or experience certain things. Desires are either conscious or such that they can be made conscious through certain activities, for example, through therapy. An act of will is a volition, an exercise of power, an endeavoring to do a certain thing.

Capacities of the Soul

In addition to its states, at any given time, the soul has a number of capacities that may or may not be currently actualized or utilized. An acorn has certain actual characteristics or states—a specific size, shape, or color. But it also has a number of capacities or potentialities that could become actual if certain things happen. For example, an acorn has the capacity to grow a root system or change into the shape of a tree. Likewise, the soul has capacities. I have the ability to see color, think about math, or desire ice cream even when I am asleep and not in the actual states just mentioned.

The adult human soul has literally thousands of capacities within its structure. But the soul is not just a collection of isolated discrete, randomly related internal capacities. Rather, the various capacities within the soul fall into natural groupings called faculties of the soul. In order to get hold of this, think for a moment about this list of capacities: the ability to see red, see orange, hear a dog bark, hear a tune, think about math, think about God, desire lunch, desire a family. Now it should be obvious that the ability to see red is more closely related to the ability to see orange than it is to the ability to think about math. We express this insight by saying that the abilities to see red or orange are parts of the same faculty—the faculty of sight. The ability to think about math is a capacity within the thinking faculty. In general, a faculty is a compartment of the soul that contains a natural family of related capacities. In my view, it is primarily the field of psychology that has the privilege and responsibility of developing a detailed map of the soul. Because of the nature of their craft, therapists and theoreticians are in an excellent position to unpack the various developmental, causal, and functional relationships among the faculties of the soul and between those faculties and the body.

We are now in a position to map out the soul in more detail. All the soul's capacities to see are part of the faculty of sight. If my eyeballs are defective, then my soul's faculty of sight will be inoperative just as a driver cannot get to work in his car if the spark plugs are broken. Likewise, if my eyeballs work but my soul is inattentive—say I am daydreaming—then I won't see what is before me either. The soul also contains faculties of smell, touch, taste, and hearing. Taken together, these five are called sensory faculties of the soul. The will is a faculty of the soul that contains my various abilities to choose. The emotional faculty of the soul contains one's abilities to experience fear, love, and so forth.

Two additional faculties of the soul are of crucial importance. The mind is that faculty of the soul that contains thoughts and beliefs along with the relevant abilities to have them. It is with my mind that I think and my mind contains my beliefs. The spirit is that faculty of the soul through which the person relates to God (Ps. 51:10; Rom. 8:16; Eph. 4:23). Before the new birth, the spirit is real and has certain abilities to be aware of God. But most of the capacities of the unregenerate spirit are dead and inoperative. At the new birth, God implants new capacities in the spirit. These fresh capacities need to be nourished and developed so they can grow.

So far I have been talking about those faculties of the soul relevant to distinctively mental functioning. However, I think the human soul is also the ground of organic, bodily development and functioning as well. It would be beyond my current purposes to develop this claim, but the interested reader can consult other sources for a discussion of the soul and its relationship to DNA and the process of morphygenesis, the process in which a zygote is transformed into an adult through a series of well defined steps (Barry, 1986; Goodwin, 1985, 1994; Locke, 1990; Moreland, 1994, 1998b; Nijhout, 1990; Polanyi, 1968; Prehn, 1994; Wells, 1992, 1993).

It is not my purpose here to offer a detailed topography of the soul and its various functions, even if I were able to do so, which I am not. As I have already pointed out, in my view, one of the main jobs of psychology is to draw a map of the soul that includes a description of its different states and faculties and to give an account of the functioning of those faculties along with the causal interactions that obtain among them and between them and the body, especially the brain. With this sketch of the soul's structure before us, I want to turn to the issue of substance dualism.

The Nature of Substance Dualism

Substance dualists hold to these two propositions: (a) Mental states (thinkings, believings, sensings, etc.) are not to be identified with physical states of any kind, including brain states or bodily behavior, because there are things true of mental states that are not true of anything physical, and vice versa; (b) not only are mental states immaterial, but so is the substance (the "I," the soul) that has these mental states because there are certain facts about us (our introspective awareness of our own selves as immaterial centers of consciousness, the fact that we can remain the same "I" even though we lose or gain body parts or mental states, the reality of libertarian free will) that require an immaterial substantial soul to account for these facts.

Let us expand, briefly, on these points. If something is merely physical, then in principle, it can be given a complete description in physical terms, say, in the categories of physics, chemistry, biology, and neurophysiology. Substance dualists want to insist, however, that neither the soul nor its internal states can be described physically. Briefly put, the dualist claims that no material thing (e.g., the moon or a carbon atom) presupposes or requires reference to consciousness for it to exist or be characterized. You will search in vain through a physics or chemistry textbook to find consciousness included in any description of matter. A completely physical description of the world would not include any terms that make reference to or characterize the existence and nature of the "I" or any of its states of consciousness. Yet the "I" and its internal states do require consciousness to characterize them adequately. So the "I" and its internal states are not physical.

To understand more fully why dualism is preferable to physicalism, we need to look briefly at what is called the nature of identity. Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) once remarked that everything is itself and not something else. This simple truth has profound implications. Suppose you want to know whether J. P. Moreland is Eileen Spiek's youngest son. If J. P. Moreland is identical to Eileen Spiek's youngest son, then, in reality, there is only one thing we are talking about: J. P. Moreland who is Eileen Spiek's youngest son. Furthermore, J. P. Moreland is identical to himself; he is not different from himself. Now if J. P. Moreland is not identical to Eileen Spiek's youngest son, then, in reality, we are talking about two things, not one.

This illustration can be generalized into a truth about the nature of identity: For any x and y, if x and y are identical (they are really the same thing, there is only one thing you are talking about, not two), then any truth that applies to x will apply to y and vice versa. This suggests a test for identity: if you could find one thing true of x not true of y, or vice versa, then x cannot be identical to (be the same thing as) y. Keep in mind that the relation of identity is different from any other relation, for example, causation, functional dependence, or constant connection. It may be that brain events cause mental events or vice versa (e.g., having certain electrical activity in the brain may cause me to experience a pain; having an intention to raise my arm may cause bodily events). It may be that certain mental functions depend on brain functions before they can take place, and vice versa. It may be that for every mental activity, a neurophysiologist can find a physical activity in the brain with which it is correlated. But just because A causes B (fire causes smoke), or A cannot function without B functioning, or A and B are constantly correlated with each other, that does not mean that A is identical to B. Something is trilateral if and only if it is triangular.But trilaterality (the property of having three sides) is not identical to triangularity (the property of having three angles), even though they are constantly conjoined.

It is not enough to establish physicalism that mental states and brain states are causally related or constantly conjoined with each other in an embodied person. Physicalism needs identity to make its case, and if something is true, or possibly true of a mental substance, property, or event that is not true, or possibly true of a physical substance, property, or event, physicalism is false. With this in mind, here are four arguments, based on identity or a lack thereof, for a dualist construal of the soul and its internal states. Arguments one and two focus on the states within the soul, three and four on the soul or "I" itself.

First, there is the simple fact that consciousness itself is not something that can be described in physical categories. For example, the felt, experienced texture of our sensory states of awareness–the hurtfulness of pain, the experienced tone of an awareness of sound, the vivacity of an awareness of red–cannot be captured by physics, chemistry, or neurophysiology. A pain is not a hardware state of the brain nor is it a tendency to grimace and shout, "Ouch!"

A pain is a certain felt state of consciousness to which I have first person, private access. No one can be aware of my pain in this way, but others can be aware of the brain state correlated with my pain in the same ways I have available to me. If a red object seems orange to me for some reason or another, then the statement “The object is orange” is false (since it is red), but the statement “The object seems orange to me” is true. The former statement is about a physical object, say a red ball, and could be—and in this case, is—false; the latter statement is about a private state of my own consciousness—the state in which something seems or appears orange to me, and it is hard to see how I could be wrong about such a claim. If the object appears orange to me then I know this for certain, even if my claim about the ball itself could be mistaken.

A scientist deaf from birth who knew everything there was to know about the physical aspects of hearing would, if she suddenly gained the ability to hear, learn completely new facts totally left out of her prior exhaustive knowledge of the physical aspects of hearing, namely, what it is like to hear. If one hallucinates a pink elephant, then there is an awareness of pink in one’s mind, but there is no awareness of pink in the brain as would become evident if a detailed brain scan were done at that moment. All such a scan would reveal would be chemical and electrical activity, but no awareness of pink would be detected. Consciousness itself cannot be described using physical predicates, and the various states of consciousness are distinct from the physical states of the brain though, of course, they causally interact with those brain states.

Second, our conscious states have intentionality, but no physical state has intentionality, so our conscious states are not physical. Intentionality refers to the *ofness* or *aboutness* of our mental states. I have a thought of the President, a hope for rain, a fear about a coming visit to the dentist. No physical state is of or about another physical state. One state of the brain may cause another one to follow, but no brain state is about anything. A thought is only one type of mental state that has intentionality. Sensations, beliefs, and desires have this feature as well. But while we are on the topic of thoughts as an illustration of intentionality, it will be useful to say a few more things about thoughts that show they are not physical. To repeat, thoughts are of things, but nothing physical is of anything.

Further, a thought, say that, necessarily, triangles have 180 degrees, does not have size, shape, spatial location, chemical composition, or electrical properties. But the state of my brain correlated with a thought does have these features. Third, some thoughts logically entail other thoughts. For example, the thought “Grass is green” logically entails the thought that “It is false that grass is not green,” even if someone does not actually draw this inference. More generally, thoughts are the kinds of things that can stand in logical relations with each other. But physical objects (e.g., states of the brain) do not stand in logical relations to each other. One brain state may cause another brain state or be diffused over a larger area of the brain than another brain state, but brain states themselves are neither true nor false and one brain state does not entail another brain state.

Moreover, the laws of nature (e.g., the law of gravity) are not necessary as are the logical laws of thought. It is easy to conceive of possible worlds where the laws of nature are quite different from their character in our world. But there is no possible world in which the laws of logic do not obtain. Finally, certain thoughts are normative with respect to other thoughts, that is, if I hold to certain thoughts, then I ought to hold to other thoughts. If I believe that P is taller than Q and Q is taller than R, then I ought to hold that P is taller than R. But no physical state is normative with respect to another. Physical states just are; they have no normative character whatsoever.

The third argument focuses on sameness through change. A physical object like a desk or car does not stay literally the same object if it loses its old parts and gains new ones. If, for example, you take a car and replace all of its parts with new ones, then the car is literally a different car. By contrast, a human being remains literally the same human person even if he has an entire replacement of parts and mental states like memories or personality traits. If God wished, he could give a person an entirely new body, set of memories, and personality traits and that person could still be literally the same individual. In fact, it is possible for a human person to exist with no memories or personality traits at all, say the first few seconds after God created Adam. Moreover, it is surely possible that a human person could exist even if no physical object whatsoever existed. These considerations point to the conclusion that a human person is more than his or her body, memories, and personality traits. A human person is a substantial, unified ego, an enduring “I” who has a body, memories, and personality. Substance dualism makes sense of this fact.

Finally, what we called libertarian freedom earlier in this article is real and sufficient to refute physicalism because physicalism implies determinism.[2] Libertarians claim that the freedom necessary for responsible action is not compatible with determinism. Real freedom requires a type of control over one's action—and, more importantly, over one's will—such that, given a choice to do *A* (raise one's hand and vote) or *B* (leave the room or simply refrain from raising one's hand), nothing determines which choice is made. Rather, the agent himself simply exercises his own causal powers and wills (or has the power to refrain from willing) to do one or the other. When an agent wills *A,* he could have also willed *B* or at least refrained from willing *A* without anything else being different inside or outside of his being. He is the absolute originator of his own actions. When an agent acts freely, he is a first or unmoved mover; no event causes him to act. His desires, beliefs, and so forth may influence his choice, but free acts are not caused by prior states in the agent. Such freedom is real—moral responsibility requires it and we are aware of exercising such freedom when we act—and it presupposes a substantial, immaterial self to be possible.

Event causation is a model of efficient causality widely employed in science, and it is the type of causation that characterized the causal activity of physical objects. Suppose a brick breaks a glass. In general, event causation can be defined in this way: An event of kind *K* (the moving of the brick) in circumstances of kind *C* (the glass being in a solid and not liquid state) occurring to an entity of kind *E* (the glass object itself) causes an event of kind *Q* (the breaking of the glass) to occur. Here, all causes and effects are events that constitute causal chains construed either deterministically (causal conditions are sufficient for an effect to obtain) or probabilistically (causal conditions are sufficient to fix the changes for an effect to obtain).

By contrast, recall our earlier description of libertarian agency: Person *P* exercises libertarian agency, and freely and intentionally brings about some event *e* (e.g., raising his hand to vote) just in case (a) *P* is a substance that has the active power to bring about *e*; (b) *P* exerted his power as a first mover (an originator of change) to bring about *e*; (c) *P* had the categorical ability to refrain from exerting his power to bring about *e*; (d) *P* acted for the sake of a reason which serves as the final cause or teleological goal for which *P* acted. Physical substances do not have the capacity to act with libertarian agency, but a substantial, immaterial soul does.

IV. The Self is the Soul

Space forbids me to offer an adequate defense of the fact that the self is a substantial soul. However, it should be clear from what has already been said, that the type of unity and agency characteristic of a substantial soul, along with the internal structure of the various sorts of functional capacities of thought, emotion, desire, belief, and so forth that constitute the nature of a substantial soul answer to a good bit of what contemporary psychologists say about the self. Instead of developing a defense of these assertions, I want to do two things in this section in lieu of such a defense: (a) list three features of the self widely acknowledged by psychologists that seem to require a substantial soul as we have come to understand that notion before these features can be accepted—in discussing these traits, I will respond to some of the confusions about the self listed in section I— and (b) clarify and recommend a way of viewing the set of distinctions (e.g., self concept, being a self) mentioned in section I.

Current Views of Self That Require a Substantial Soul

Here are three features of the self as described by contemporary psychologists that seem to require a substantial soul:

First, perhaps more than any other theorist, W. W. Meissner (1986, 1993) has argued that two features are central to contemporary psychoanalytic models of the self: Meissner claimed that the self is a substantial, unified, supraordinate, structured entity which is characterized by first person subjectivity (cf. DeCharms, 1987). Such a self is an objectively existing, thinking, self-conscious, self-reflective substance that is not a creation of language/culture. Meissner also affirmed that the various functions of the self are aspects of the same self, that the self is more than simply the sum of its psychic structures, that it can be likened to an organizing principle that guides development, is independent from and more than the sum of its parts, and contains its various capacities within it. (Meissner, 1993, pp. 475-476, 486-487).

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[2] Even if physicalism is taken to imply indeterminism, this is not sufficient to allow for libertarian freedom. The reason is because physicalism, in both its deterministic and indeterministic forms, implies event causation. All events are (deterministically or probabilistically) caused by prior events, and no room is allowed for a first-moving, substantial agent who initiates action. The discussion of event causation is a bit technical, so I will continue to talk about freedom and determinism instead of freedom and event causation. For more on this, see John Bishop (1989).

I should now be clear that the sort of unity Meissner had in mind fits the primitive, internal unity of a substance more than the loose, externally related bundle of properties, functional capacities, and separable parts characteristic of a property-thing. And we have seen reason for thinking that the sorts of features contained in the self (first person subjectivity, libertarian agency, capacities for conscious awareness, thought, etc.) are not themselves physical. Moreover, this understanding of the self has room for the self to fragment and become dysfunctional in various ways and for one to lose awareness of the real personal unity or continuity that is there. Because the substantial soul is not simple, but rather, contains a primitive unity of faculties, it can become internally fragmented in various ways without literally becoming different substantial souls.

Second, Meissner (1986, 1993) indicated that the self is a free, responsible agent who is the absolute originator of its own actions. DeCharms (1987) went so far as claiming that "a scientific concept of self that does not encompass personal causation [i.e., a personal causal agent] is inadequate" (p. 18). DeCharms's and Meissner's description of agency would seem to be a libertarian one, though they are not as clear here as one would wish; and, as we have seen, a substantial soul seems to be a necessary condition for such agency (cf. Moreland, 1998a).

Such a self qua actor cannot be a creation of language, but is instead an ontologically existing reality with its own features and nature independent of our descriptions of it. On this point, Meissner (1986, 1993) and DeCharms (1987) were clearly right. In my view, while linguistic skills can enhance thinking, one need not think in language, and, in fact, the only way a physical sign can be regarded as a linguistic symbol is if a conscious, thinking subject intends it to be a representation of a meaning or thought in his or her mind (cf. Willard, 1973). More specifically, the pronoun *I* refers to a substantial self because such a self uses *I* in acts of self-reference, and this is what makes the term *I* a personal pronoun in the first place. Language is created by thinking, substantial selves, not the other way around.

Third, according to a number of descriptions of the self, it is a thing which is more than the sum of its structural components and functions and which has a complicated structural hierarchy of functions, including a hierarchical structure of aims and goals for the sake of which the self acts (Meissner, 1993, pp. 472, 476, 485; DeCharms, 1987, p. 20). The fit between these descriptions and the classic understanding of the soul as a substance with an internal structure of inseparable faculties, functionally interconnected within the soul should now be clear. That may be what Meissner was attempting to describe. However, when he uses language like "a substantial, supraordinate, structured entity" to characterize the self, such language is vague, metaphysically speaking.

For one thing, what is meant by "substantial" here and what is the substantial self's relation to structure? Meissner (1986, pp. 388-396; 1993, pp. 462-468, 473, 474-477) went back and forth between the self as a substance and the self as identical to a hierarchy of structures, but the latter is a property-thing view and the former is not. Moreover, the substance position implies that the self is what has a hierarchy of (internally related) structures; it is not identical to those structures themselves. Second, if the self is supraordinate in that it is a whole over and above its parts, functions, and so forth, in what sense are we to understand this? Does this mean that the self is a property-thing, a whole with emergent properties and a derived unity of externally related separable parts (e.g., functional capacities)? Or is the self a substance with a primitive unity of inseparable parts (e.g., functional capacities)? Meissner explicitly affirmed the substance view, but in the absence of careful metaphysical distinctions between substances and property-things, his language is not as clear as one would wish. Finally, is the structure in question a set of internal relations within an ontologically prior whole, or is the structure a set of external relations that emerge upon an ontologically prior set of parts? I have argued that the substantial soul model of the human person is what is being expressed here and that, in fact, a clarified model of a substantial soul may be taken as a way of making precise what psychologists mean by "a substantial, supraordinate, structured entity."

Some Conceptual Confusions and Terminological Equivocations

In section I, I listed in two groups a number of notions that are often used equivocally and about which there is no uniform agreement: group 1—becoming a self, being a self, developing as a self, selfhood; group 2—self awareness, awareness of the self as a self, self image, self concept, self representation, having a conception of the self. On the basis of what I have argued about substance, soul, and self, I want to recommend the following distinctions.

The phrases in group 1 are ontological notions having to do with the language, theory-independent reality, and nature of the self. In my view, to be a self is to be a substance of a certain kind, namely, a person. A human self is a certain kind of person; God and angels are different kinds of selves. Animals have substantial souls with a center of consciousness capable of rather simple mental states (sensations, emotions, simple thoughts and beliefs). But animals should not be called selves because their souls do not have a sufficiently rich structure to count as persons. For example, they do not have second order mental states—they cannot think about their thinkings and, therefore, cannot repent; they are not aware of their awarenesses and don't have beliefs about their beliefs; arguably, they do not engage in libertarian acts and, thus, do not have the sort of genuine agency characteristic of free, responsible human action; they are incapable of certain forms of abstract thought and moral or spiritual awareness; arguably, they do not use language (cf. Oller & Omdahl, 1994, pp. 235-269; Swinburne, 1986, pp. 203-297). Moreover, a human being is an eternal self that comes into existence at the moment of conception and never ceases to be.

Selfhood is the same thing as personhood and refers to that range of properties and ultimate capacities that characterize all and only persons, for example, responsible agency, moral awareness, the ultimate capacity to have certain sorts of awarenesses, beliefs, desires, and thoughts. It is in virtue of having selfhood that a human being is a self. Developing as a self refers to the process of maturation and growth that ought to characterize the sort of maturation appropriate for persons. So understood, developing as a self is a normative notion and not simply a descriptive one. Thus, a dysfunctional self is a self that is not developing as it ought.

Finally, I do not think that there is any such thing as becoming a self literally. Such a phrase may simply mean "developing into a mature self" or "gaining integrated self representations" or some such thing. But no one literally becomes a self. The property of being a self (selfhood) is like the property of being even possessed by numbers or being an oak or being a lion. Something either is or is not even, an oak, a lion, or a self. Nothing can gradually become any of these things literally, nor is there any such thing as a potential self/person.

Group 2 is a list of epistemological notions which refer to various concepts central to one's knowledge of or thinking about the self. Self awareness refers to a self's direct awareness of either itself or one of its inner states (e.g., a pain, desire, thought). I can be aware of something, say a tree, without having any concept whatever of the thing in question, without thinking of the object, or without having the linguistic skills to tell others about my awareness. A person could look out her window and be directly aware of a tree (and recall this from memory) while thinking about a writing project in which she was engaged. By way of application, children can have self awareness before they learn language.

A concept of the self is a certain rudimentary, conscious, mental understanding of what a self is. A concept of the self need not be the sort of thing that can be imaged or pictured by way of sense data. For example, I may have a concept of a self as an immaterial person but I cannot image or picture this concept. Awareness of the self as a self requires that a person have a concept of a self and interpret his or her self awarenesses as awarenesses of a self. An act of direct awareness is not a mental judgment or an act of interpretation; an awareness of an entity as being such and such (e.g., of that object as being a hat) is a judgment, an interpretation of an awareness as falling under the concept of such and such, and, thus, such an awareness requires that the person have the relevant concept (e.g., what it is to be a hat). Therefore, one cannot have an awareness of the self as a self without a concept of a self. But one need not have mastered the linguistic term *self* nor need he have a theory of the self in order to have a concept of a self. A concept is a nonlinguistic entity in the mind.

Having a conception of the self means that one has a theory of the self. Normal folks have a concept of the self; those who study philosophy or psychology have a conception of the self. A conception of the self can change one's concept of the self. A self image is a conscious, sensory picture or image of the self in which I represent my self to myself in a sensory way, say, as attractive, as muscular, and so forth. A self representation is a way of imaging or conceiving the self that includes either conscious or unconscious factors. Thus, a self representation includes but goes beyond a self image or self concept.

In my view, some of the confusions about the self mentioned in section I follow from conflating epistemological notions of the self in group 2 with ontological ones in group 1. For example, I may come to have a self concept, self image, or self representation, but this does not mean that I come to be a self or that I somehow gain selfhood.

I have tried to clarify the nature of a substance and sketch some of the reasons why substance dualism is the best way to take the self. I think that the notion of the self as a substantial soul is a justified true belief of central relevance to psychological models of the self, and I have tried to explain some of the reasons why I think this way. I believe the time is right for Christian philosophers, psychologists, and theologians to restore substance to the soul of psychology.

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