

TTPH 667
Philosophy of Mind/Soul

J. P. Moreland, Ph.D.
www.jpmoreland.com

Spring, 2011
Biola University

Purpose: The purpose of this course is to introduce the student to some of the major areas of debate in the philosophy of mind/soul, as well as the major positions and persons involved in the debate, and to help the student develop his or her own view about the mind/soul.

Objectives: The course objectives are to a) gain factual knowledge, b) learn fundamental principles, generalizations, and theories, c) learn how to analyze and critically evaluate ideas, arguments and points of view in philosophy of mind by accomplishing these specific goals:

1. To examine some of the main arguments for and against property and substance dualism, as well as some of the options within dualism.
2. To examine and critique some of the main alternatives to dualism (e.g. different versions of the identity thesis, philosophical behaviorism, forms of functionalism, eliminative materialism).
3. To examine in brief fashion some of the issues involved in debates about personal identity, including issues regarding the simplicity of the self.
4. To expose the student to the practice of integration in the area of philosophical anthropology.

Schedule: The course will meet M according to the following schedule:

| Week | Reading Assignment |
|-------------|---|
| #1 1/31 | #5 ch. 1; #7, Introduction |
| #2 2/7 | #1 ch. 2 |
| #3 2/14 | #1 chs. 3-4 |
| #4 2/21 | #2 chs. 1-3 |
| #5 2/28 | Review of weeks 1-4; #2 ch. 4 |
| #6 3/7 | Exam over Churchland/Kim Reading (only ch. 3) (3/8) |
| #7 3/14 | #2 chs. 5-6; #7 ch. 3 (3/17 No Class) |
| #8 3/21 | #2 chs. 8, 9 |
| #9 3/28 | #6 chs. 1-2 (1 st Kim paper due) (3/31) |
| #10 4/4 | Exam over Kim #2 chs. 4, 5, 6, 8 (4/12) |

| | |
|----------|---|
| #11 4/11 | #6 chs. 3,4; #7 chs. 4, 7; (2 st Kim paper due) (4/21) |
| #12 4/18 | #6 chs. 7,8; RR1, RR2 |
| #13 5/2 | #6 ch. 10; (3 rd Kim paper) (5/5) |
| #14 5/9 | #5 ch. 6; #6 chs. 11,14 |
| #15 5/16 | #4 chs. 1,5,6 |
| #16 5/23 | FINALS WEEK |

Textbooks:

- #1: Paul Churchland, *Matter and Consciousness* (MIT, rev. ed., 1988).
- #2: Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophy of Mind* (Westview, 2d. ed., 2006).
- #3: Jaegwon Kim, *Mind in a Physical World* (MIT 1998).
- #4: Jaegwon Kim, *Physicalism or Something Near Enough* (Princeton, 2005).
- #5: J. P. Moreland, Scott B. Rae, *Body and Soul* (InterVarsity, 2000).
- #6: Richard Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul* (Clarendon, rev. ed., 1997).
- #7: E. J. Lowe, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, 2000).

Reserve Reading

- RR1: David Barnett, "You Are Simple," in *The Waning of Materialism*, ed. by Robert Koons, George Bealer (Oxford, 2010), pp. 161-74.
- RR2: J. P. Moreland, "Substance Dualism and the Argument from Self-Awareness," *Philosophia Christi* (forthcoming).

Assignments: The assignments for the course are as follows:

#1: All textbooks are to be read in their entirety, in slow, painstaking fashion, with notes and underlining. A card will be turned in at the beginning of class on **May 19** stating the percentage of reading you completed for the semester. Due 5/19. **(Worth 15% of final grade)**

#2: There will be two objective exams over the Churchland and Kim (#2) assignments and class discussion. **(Worth 40% of final grade [20% for each exam]) (dates listed above)**

#3: Kim Papers: Three papers are to be done on Kim #3 and #4 according to the schedule above. Each paper is to be 1000 words in length (give a word count on your paper). Since space is precious, you need not give an introduction or conclusion to your paper. Get right to the questions and answer them, but when you do, be sure to use

good philosophical style in your writing. **(Worth 45% of final grade [15% for each paper]) [due dates listed above]**

Paper 1: From Kim #3 chapter 1, describe his view of supervenience, realization, and the dependence of the mental on the physical, and describe Kim's view of their interrelationship. Next, assuming physical realizationism (a.k.a. physicalist functionalism), answer the question of whether physicalist functionalism is a version of reductionism and justify your answer.

Paper 2: From Kim #3 chapter 2, describe the problem of causal exclusion. Assuming that mental events are constituted by mental properties and that mental properties are genuinely emergent mental entities, do you think there is a plausible physicalist case for top/down mental-to-physical causal feedback? Why or why not?

Paper 3: From Kim #4 chapter 3, describe Kim's presentation of the causal pairing problem, state why Kim thinks that this problem refutes both standard Cartesian substance dualism and the view that there are spatially located souls, and provide your own response to Kim.