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NATURALISM, NOMINALISM, AND HUSSERLIAN MOMENTS

There are several fruitful entry points for getting at Husserl's philosophy. One can study him as an example of phenomenological methodology or as an epistemologist. My own interests lie in his ontology, specifically, the debate about the proper assay of Husserlian "moments" and the bearing of this assay on the broader question of whether or not Husserl was a nominalist. The question of Husserl's nominalism is not merely a matter of proper Husserlian exegesis. Among other things, his commitment to universals was a crucial part of his career-long criticism of naturalism. As we shall see shortly, it has been argued that the *Logical Investigations* are either explicitly nominalistic or else they contain the seeds of nominalism. Some claim that this early nominalism justifies the assertion either that Husserl remained a nominalist throughout his career or that these early nominalistic seeds came to full flower with the development of the doctrine of noemata. On this view, "universals" come to be treated like noemata, viz., as dependent particulars produced by the mind and Husserl comes to accept a conceptualist form of nominalism.

Now it seems odd that a philosopher of Husserl's stature would change his mind on such an important topic without ever explicitly saying so. Moreover, given the centrality of Husserlian realism for his ongoing critique of naturalism, the burden of proof would seem to rest with those who claim that Husserl always accepted or came to accept nominalism. Obviously, these remarks presuppose that the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* and, perhaps, the early chapters of *Ideas I* was a realist.¹ But this has been denied. Thus, Gustav Bergmann claimed that "... Husserl made two major mistakes. For one, he is a nominalist."² More recently, Reinhardt Grossmann claims to have provided a criterion by which to identify whether a particular philosopher is a realist or nominalist. Grossmann puts the point this way:

"A certain view about the nature of properties has had a grip on the minds of many philosophers. According to this view, the whiteness of billiard ball A is not the same thing as the whiteness of billiard ball B. Each ball has its own whiteness, so that we must distinguish between

whiteness₁ and whiteness₂, whiteness₁ being the color of A and whiteness₂ being the color of B.”³

Grossmann seems to think that if a philosopher uses definite descriptions like “the F of A” or “the F of B” to refer to non-identical entities, then that philosopher is a nominalist. On this view, acceptance of property-instances in addition to properties is all that is required to qualify as a nominalist. Grossmann explicitly applies this claim to Husserlian moments and identifies him as a nominalist.

In what follows, I hope to rebut the assertion that Husserl’s “moments” are an indication that he was a nominalist. After clarifying some preliminary issues, I shall evaluate two different assays of Husserlian moments and relate them to the realist/nominalist dialog in order to show that Husserl was a realist. In the preliminary issues that follow, I, first, clarify three schools of thought regarding the ontological status of properties; second, provide a precis of the connection between naturalism and nominalism that is widely, though not universally accepted in most of the contemporary literature, especially those aspects of the connection explicitly affirmed by Husserl; third, clarify the central issues of contention between realist and nominalist construals of properties and their instances. To get at these issues and to avoid begging the question, I shall focus on the early and late views of perhaps the most important nominalist of the last half of the twentieth century, Keith Campbell.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

1. Three Views of Properties

There are three main views regarding the ontological status of properties with different varieties of each. First, there is *extreme nominalism* according to which irreducible properties do not exist. The extreme nominalist is committed to

¹Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, translation of second edition by J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970) (hereafter, *LI*); *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, translated by F. Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982) (hereafter, *Ideas I*).

²Gustav Bergmann, *Logic and Reality* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 194.

³Reinhardt Grossmann, *The Existence of the World* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 30. Cf. 30-41.

⁴D. M. Armstrong, *Universals & Scientific Realism Vol. I: Nominalism & Realism; Volume II: A Theory of Universals* (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1978); *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) *A World of States of Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁵See J. P. Moreland, “Issues and Options in Exemplification,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33 (April, 1996): 133-47; “Naturalism and the Ontological Status of Properties,” in *Naturalism: A Critical Analysis*, edited by William Lane Craig, J. P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 67-109.

⁶Howard Robinson, *Matter and Sense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 50.

⁷Wilfrid Sellars, *Naturalism and Ontology* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Pub. Co., 1979), p. 109.

the following sort of reductive analysis of properties :

a has the attribute F, if and only if, Q.

Different versions of extreme nominalism will spell out Q in different ways. A predicate extreme nominalist may spell out Q as "the predicate 'F' is true of a." A class extreme nominalist may state Q as "a is a member of the class of F-things." A concept extreme nominalist would substitute for Q something like "a falls under the concept F."

The second major view is *nominalism*. A nominalist acknowledges the existence of properties but denies they are universals. Instead, properties are themselves particulars which have been given various labels: "tropes," "abstract particulars," "perfect particulars," "cases," "aspects," "unit properties," "property-instances."

Finally, *realism* takes properties to be multiply-exemplifiable entities that can be in more than one thing at the same time or in the same thing at different, interrupted times. Properties are identities-in-many. The traditional realist takes properties and the way they are in their instances to be abstract in the sense of being non-spatio-temporal. Recently, D. M. Armstrong has rejected the axiom of localization and analyzed universals as multiply located entities.⁴ Either way, universals are multiply-exemplifiable entities. I myself am a traditional realist and I have criticized Armstrong's views elsewhere.⁵ In any case, I take Husserl to have been a traditional realist, so from now on, I shall use "realism" to mean traditional realism.

2. The Connection Between Naturalism and Both Forms of Nominalism

A specific connection between naturalism and nominalism has been widely accepted ever since Plato first pointed it out. In the contemporary setting, anti-naturalist Howard Robinson remarks that "materialist [naturalist] theories are incompatible with realist theories of universals. The tie between nominalism and materialism [naturalism] is an ancient one."⁶ Similarly, naturalist Wilfrid Sellars claimed that "a naturalist ontology must be a nominalist ontology."⁷

It would be impossible to define contemporary philosophical naturalism in terms that would procure universal assent. Fortunately, there are certain themes that its contemporary friends and foes take to constitute the most viable form of naturalism and those themes characterize the sort of naturalism against which Husserl fought.

Roughly, naturalism is the view that the spatio-temporal universe of entities postulated by our best (or ideal) theories in the physical sciences is all there is. Scientific naturalism includes 1) different aspects of a naturalist epistemic attitude (e.g., a rejection of so-called first philosophy along with an acceptance of either

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weak or strong scientism); 2) an etiological account of how all entities whatsoever have come to be, constituted by an event causal story (especially the atomic theory of matter and evolutionary biology) spelled out in natural scientific terms; and 3) a general ontology in which the only entities allowed are ones that cohere well with the naturalist epistemology and etiology and that bear a relevant similarity to those thought to characterize a completed form of physics.

There are at least eight features of naturalism—four epistemological and four ontological—that Husserl took to be at odds with the existence and knowability of universals and their connections. Since he correctly took the epistemological features to be largely responsible for the ontological ones, I shall list them in that order:⁸

Epistemological Factors

- (1) Naturalists eschew so-called first philosophy, especially when it is taken to provide knowledge of reality foundational for empirical science, yet knowledge of universals is such a foundational matter of first philosophy.⁹
- (2) Naturalists reject a priori intuition and propositional knowledge traditionally conceived, yet this is precisely what an eidetic intuition of a universal provides.¹⁰
- (3) Naturalists adopt a scientific, empiricistic form of epistemological methodism, coupled with a strong emphasis on theoretical simplicity. As a result, they view universals as superstitious idols, Scholastic entities whose only justification is metaphysical speculation from which science has freed us.¹¹
- (4) Naturalists reject a first-person approach to knowledge in favor of a third person perspective. As a result, they set aside the categorical classification of thought-contents and the description of various mental acts in favor of inductive, empirical studies of the causal connections involved with contingent, changing psychic events. As a result, the distinction between normal sensory perception and eidetic intuition is lost and, along with it, the difference in the objects, especially universals, upon which those acts are directed.¹²

Ontological Factors

- (5) For naturalists, reality is exhausted by the spatio-temporal causal order of particulars. Traditional realist universals are outside space and time and, thus, are rejected.¹³

⁸*LI Vol. I*, pp. 368-370. For additional criticism of naturalism by Husserl, see "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. by Quentin Lauer (N. Y.: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 71-147; *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. by David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

⁹*LI Vol. I*, pp. 22; *Ideas I*, pp. xix-xx, xxii,

15-17, 18, 33-34.

¹⁰*LI Vol. I*, pp. 338, 348-349; *Ideas I*, pp. xxii, 34-36, 39, 45-46.

¹¹*LI Vol. I*, pp. 5; *Ideas I*, pp. 35-36.

¹²*LI Vol. I*, pp. 348-349, 368-370, 372, 341.

¹³*Ideas I*, pp. xx, 7, 35-36.

¹⁴*LI Vol. I*, pp. 350-351; *Ideas I*, pp. 35-36.

¹⁵*LI Vol. I*, pp. 12, 15, 372, 446-447; *Ideas I*, pp. 7, 15, 33.

¹⁶*LI Vol. I*, pp. 368-370, 421; *Ideas I*, p. xx.

- (6) Naturalists most commonly accept some form or another of atomism. In so doing, they (a) accept separable parts and employ a mere distinction of reason to deal with the different "aspects" of those parts and (b) reject inseparable parts and the universals required to characterize them and their (especially founding) connections to other entities.¹⁴
- (7) For naturalists, spatio-temporal individuals, their causal connections, and the laws of nature are all contingent and physical necessity is the only form of necessity they accept. Since universals and many of the relations among them involve a form of *de re* modality that is deeper than mere physical necessity, naturalists do not countenance universals.¹⁵
- (8) Naturalists embrace the Eleatic Principle and accept only those entities that are efficient causes or effects of such causes in the spatio-temporal order. Some universals make a contribution to the precise nature of specific efficient causal connections and others do not. In any case, universals are not themselves spatio-temporal efficient causes or effects of such causes and, thus, they fail the Eleatic Principle.¹⁶

My purpose is not to defend Husserl on these points, though I do agree with all of them. I simply place them before us as a backdrop for the arguments of the last section. For now, let us look at the notion of properties and property-instances in Keith Campbell's ontology to set up the dialectical background for the debate about Husserlian moments.

3. Realism and the Trope Nominalism of the Early and Late Campbell

Among other things, Campbell's nominalism is motivated by his commitment to naturalism. By distinguishing two phases in Campbell's trope nominalism, one can gain insight into what a nominalist will not abandon on pain of denying nominalism. This allows us to draw a conclusion about what is essential to nominalism. Campbell has proffered an analysis of both properties and property-instances. The former has remained constant in his thought: A property is a set whose members are all and only those tropes that exactly resemble each other in the relevant way. Thus, redness is the set of all and only red tropes, e.g., red₁, red₂, etc.

Tropes are property-instances in Campbell's ontology and his assay of them has changed over the years. For purpose of exposition, suppose we have before us two red, round spots called Socrates and Plato. According to the early Campbell, the proper way to assay "Socrates is red" is this: the simple trope, red₁, which is a mem-

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ber of the similarity set "redness", is a part of the whole, Socrates, and Socrates is a bundle of compresent tropes.¹⁷

In Campbell's earlier writings, a trope was taken to be an abstract particular. By "particular" he meant an entity that is exhausted in one embodiment; by "abstract" Campbell meant an item which is got before the mind by an act of abstraction, that is, by concentrating attention on some, but not all, of what is presented. Examples of tropes are the specific, numerically singular taste of a lollipop, or its specific color, shape, etc.

Further, tropes are basic, primitive entities. Campbell says of a trope: "It embraces no variety at all."¹⁸ Again, "They are *infimae species*, taken as particulars."¹⁹ In another place he says "They are in Hume's sense substances, and indeed resemble his impressions, conceived realistically rather than idealistically."²⁰

On this view, a trope, construed as a basic particular, is simple, fundamental, and independent. By "simple" is meant that they have no further real parts (ones that can be separated off as continuing entities from the whole in reality and not merely in thought). The notion of being fundamental is explained this way. Entity A is fundamental relative to entity B if B's existence depends on A but not vice versa. Finally, "independence" means that an entity is truly independent if it could be the only entity in the universe in the broadly logical sense. Tropes (at least non-emergent ones), then, are basic particulars. Concrete particulars like Socrates are derivative and it is a contingent fact that tropes usually come grouped together as concrete particulars.

An additional, important feature of tropes on Campbell's earlier view was the central role that space (or space-time) played in spelling out what a trope is. First of all, tropes do not exclude one another from being at the same place. In fact, a concrete particular is just a "clump" of compresent tropes at a place.

Second, a trope exists at one definite location; it is a quality-at-a-place. Campbell claimed that this should not be taken to imply that a trope has two different constituents, viz., its qualitative nature (which is a universal) and its place (which is particular). A quality-at-a-place is a single, particular reality. This is clarified by Campbell's view of the special status of the geometric figures of an

¹⁷Cf. Keith Campbell, "Abstract Particulars and the Philosophy of Mind," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61 (June 1983): 129-141; "The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars" in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume VI: The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* ed. by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 477-88; *Metaphysics: An Introduction* (Encino, Ca: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 206-19.

¹⁸Campbell, *Metaphysics*, p. 213.

¹⁹Campbell, "Abstract Particulars," p. 141.

²⁰Campbell, "Abstract Particulars," p. 130.

²¹Cf. J. P. Moreland, *Universals, Qualities, and Quality-Instances* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), pp. 71-74; "Keith Campbell and the Trope View of Predication," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 67 (December 1989): 379-93. For Campbell's admission of the force of these puzzles, see Keith Campbell, *Abstract Particulars* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 65-66.

entity, i.e., its form and volume. Form and volume are special tropes not like any others. Their presence in a particular compresent sum of tropes is not contingent; tropes cannot be present except by being in a formed volume. Tropes are, therefore, essentially regional. Wherever a trope is, there is formed volume. On the other hand, Campbell asserted that shape and size are not found except in company with characteristics. So formed volume is both essential to ordinary tropes and in itself insufficient to count as a proper being. Since the shape and size of a red trope are inseparable from its color, then the former are not really different entities from the latter. Inseparable entities appear to be identical for Campbell; they differ only by a distinction of reason. Put differently, the place (located, formed volume) and qualitative nature of a trope are identical and differ only as different ways of thinking of or speaking about the trope—a mere distinction of reason.

Recall that if A and B differ by a distinction of reason, then A is identical to B. With this in mind, I want to raise two puzzles that are problematic for Campbell's earlier views. Indeed, Campbell saw these puzzles in an earlier critique of mine and admitted that they were decisive against his position.²¹ Consider a concrete particular, say, an apple. The taste trope and color trope of the apple, indeed all the apple's tropes, are at the same place since the apple is merely a bundle of compresent tropes. Now the nature of the taste trope differs from its location/formed volume by a distinction of reason only. Likewise, with the color trope and all the others. But then, the taste of the apple is identical to its place as are all the other tropes in the bundle. Now by the transitivity of identity, all the tropes of the apple are identical to each other and, indeed, the apple is reduced to a bare location. Concrete and abstract particulars turn out to be bare simples or ontological blobs, to use Armstrong's term, and this is incoherent. This is puzzle one.

To understand puzzle two consider two compresent bundles of tropes, A and B. Bundle A includes a red and a taste trope at the same location. Bundle B includes a blue trope and a taste trope from the same exact similarity set as the taste trope in bundle A. In other words, the concrete particulars A and B differ in color but have the "same" taste. Now, the red trope of A is in a set of other red tropes exactly similar to it. Since the red trope's "redness" is identical to its place/formed volume (they differ merely by a distinction of reason) and since the nature of A's taste trope is also identical to the same place, A's red trope (by the transitivity of identity) is identical to A's taste trope. The same is true of B's taste and blue tropes. Furthermore, A's taste trope is in the same exact similarity set as B's taste trope. But this means that A's red trope and B's blue trope are in the same similarity set of taste tropes. And since exact similarity is transitive, B's blue trope will be in the similarity set of red tropes exactly like A's redness. If this is true, it is

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hard to make sense out of the idea of a similarity set based on a trope's nature. If an exact similarity set of red tropes includes a blue trope, the very idea of an exact similarity set of red tropes becomes vacuous.

It is important to see just what is going on in these puzzles. The trope view must assay a basic trope as a simple or blob in order to avoid assigning the individuating and qualitative roles to non-identical constituents in the property-instance, for this is what realists do (e.g., red₁ has an individuator, say a bare particular expressed by 1, the universal redness, and a tie of exemplification). Since tropes are simples and since place/formed volume is identical to a trope's nature (differing by a distinction of reason only), then the trope nominalist must either remove the 1 and make the identity reflect the entity redness or else remove redness and make the identity reduce to bare location. The former collapses into realism and the latter is incoherent as the puzzles indicate.²²

In light of these and other criticisms, Campbell has modified his trope nominalism.²³ Especially relevant to our present concerns with Husserl is his modified assay of a trope, particularly, the role of location in that assay. He continues to hold that a basic trope like red₁ is a simple entity—a particularized nature that as a matter of brute, unanalyzable fact sustains two roles: to be a particularized nature that is exactly similar in nature to other tropes in its similarity set and that is individuated from all other tropes. A basic trope is not a union of a particularized entity and a particularizer. It is a single, simple item—a particularized nature. It has no constituents—properties or parts—within it.

However, Campbell now claims that a trope is not individuated by place. As a matter of a posteriori Kripkean necessity, tropes are located, but the location of a trope is a quasi-trope (roughly, a mere appearance or pseudo-entity that is part of the manifest world and, as such, is an ontological free lunch) and as a matter of necessity is always connected to a trope (it is contingent at which place a trope is located but not that it be located): "... let us abandon the view that a colour trope is individuated by its place. Take *compresence* as a more abstract, more formal matter, recognize that a colour trope and a spatial quasi-trope are distinct entities and assay the presence of green at a place as the *compresence* of a green trope with a place one."²⁴ I have not been able to tell what distinction Campbell sees

²²It is important to note that the problems revealed by these puzzles have nothing essentially to do with the fact that Campbell held to a bundle theory of substance. If one held a trope version of a traditional, Aristotelian-type view of substance, with minor adjustments, these same puzzles would apply. Dogs as much as reds exactly resemble each other and are individuated. And on Campbell's earlier view, a dog's nature would differ from its location by a

distinction of reason. Elsewhere, I have criticized what amounts to a trope ontology combined with a traditional substance view. See J. P. Moreland, "How to be a Realist in Nominalist Clothing," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* (39 (1991): 75-101.

²³The primary place where Campbell has expressed his new position is *Abstract Particulars*.

²⁴Campbell, *Abstract Particulars*, pp. 68-69.

between a trope's formed volume and its place. But regarding formed volume, he says that it is also a quasi-trope, a sub region of space whose boundaries are fixed by the presence of the trope's nature (e.g., color), that is not identical to the qualitative content within that formed volume.

In response, let us focus on Campbell's new assay of a basic trope, starting with his claim that the new role that location or formed volume plays in his refurbished nominalism avoid problems that plagued his earlier position. Note first, that since a realist assay of a quality-instance treats it as a complex entity with its nature being a universal predicatively tied to an individuator, to avoid realism Campbell must hold that a basic trope is simple and this is where the main problems with nominalism lie. Apparently, Campbell fails to recognize that these problems turn on the simplicity of a trope and not on the role of location/formed volume in a trope's assay.

Moreover, Campbell's new view of the role of location/formed volume makes his nominalism less available to the naturalist than was his former position and Campbell is clearly concerned to present his trope nominalism as an attractive option for a naturalist ontology. Why is his new position more problematic for a naturalist? As we have seen, a widely accepted understanding of a naturalist ontological commitment is that the spatio-temporal universe of strictly physical entities that constitute the appropriate objects of natural scientific study is all there is. Campbell accepts this understanding of naturalism at least in the sense that he understands naturalism to require all entities to be spatio-temporal. In his earlier view, it was easy to see why tropes could be viewed as natural entities that are entirely within the spatio-temporal world. But the current picture of the role of location/formed volume actually comes perilously close to turning tropes into traditional abstract (non-spatio-temporal) entities, specifically, Platonic abstract perfect particulars with the proviso that they must be tied to a spatio-temporal particular to exist.

To see this, recall that for the traditional view of properties as abstract entities, properties are "in" the particulars that exemplify them, but they are not themselves spatio-temporally located at the place of those particulars. Nor is the way they are "in" those particulars a spatial relation; rather, it is the primitive nexus of exemplification. Redness is (non-spatio-temporally, predicatively) in a ball and the ball is on the table, but neither redness nor exemplification is a natural, spatio-temporal entity. It is widely recognized that when a universal is exemplified by a particular, the resulting state of affairs (the having of the universal by the particular) is itself a particular. This has been called the victory of particularity. Now in the same way there is a victory of spatio-temporality. When a ball is red, the ball

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is spatio-temporally located as is the state of affair consisting in the-having-of-redness-by-the-ball. But neither redness nor exemplification is spatio-temporal according to the traditional realist position. If one were to add the Aristotelian constraint that properties must be exemplified in order to exist, the result would rule out transcendental (unexemplified) universals, but it would not turn exemplification or exemplified properties into spatio-temporal, natural entities. They would still be abstract objects.

Now Campbell's current views seem to parallel this picture precisely. A trope's nature is a metaphysically complete entity ontologically prior to its tie to the quasi-trope of location/formed volume since the nature is not identical to the location and neither enters into the being of the other in a part/whole way. This means that the trope's nature itself is not spatial but receives spatiality from its tie to the quasi-trope of location/formed volume. Nor is it clear that this tie is spatial since it connects a nature to a location. Now how is this different from the victory of spatio-temporality in the traditional realist view? The only difference is that a trope can be embodied only in one place. But not only is it difficult now to see why this is the case—if natures are identical to locations it is easy to see this, but since spatio-temporality is not inherent in their being, but rather, tied to them, it is less clear and more ad hoc to say such a tie can occur only once—it is also hard to see how a naturalist could appropriate such an analytic ontology into his or her world view. And even if we grant that a nature can be tied to space in one embodiment only, tropes turn out to be perfect particulars on one interpretation of Plato, and such entities were still non-natural abstract entities as was the tie that Plato claimed connects them to particulars in the space-time world.

Further, the simplicity of a basic trope in Campbell's refurbished nominalism generates the same metaphysical difficulties that he admits were telling against his earlier position. Consider two red tropes. Qua red entities they stand to each other in an internal exact similarity relation grounded in their natures. But qua particulars they are spatially related to each other by an external primitive spatial relation. But the particularity and nature of a trope are identical to each other (they differ by a mere distinction of reason). It follows from this that the two simple entities stand to each other in internal and external relations due to the same metaphysical features of the relata. But how can this be? Further, by the transitivity of identity, the particularities of the two tropes stand in an internal exact similarity relation to each other and the two red natures are externally related to each other. But this is just incoherent. Moreover, since the nature and particularity of a trope are identical to each other, then the same dilemma of simplicity presents itself to Campbell: either tropes are reduced to properties as universals or to bare

²⁵Herbert Hochberg, "Things and Qualities," in *Metaphysics and Explanation*, ed. by W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (Pittsburgh:

University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 95.

²⁶Gustav Bergmann, *Logic and Reality*, pp. 214-215.

particulars. This is a matter of ontology, not epistemology. And the distinction of reason, along with the epistemological use of abstraction, different modes of counting, and so forth obscure the real metaphysical problems involved here. Campbell's shift from using the distinction of reason between a trope's nature and location to using it between that nature and particularity does not solve the problem which centers primarily on the simplicity of tropes and not the special role of place in their assay. And as I have already pointed out, his new view of place is less, not more compatible with the naturalist stance. The essence of nominalism lies in its being a blob theory and therein lies its major difficulties.

Generalizing from Campbell, we see that the essence of realism lies not in a commitment to universals as abstract objects (though I believe them to be such), along with just any old view of exemplification. Rather, it resides precisely in a view of properties as multiply-exemplifiable constituents in the things that have them, whether they be concrete or "abstract" particulars. Realism is a layer-cake ontology. After all, neither exemplification construed as a set membership relation, nor as a model/copy relation, nor as some sort of primitive kind/case tie yields true multiply-exemplifiable entities, since in all these cases the set or perfect particular or kind is still a particular, even if a non spatio-temporal one.

For those realists who accept property-instances as different entities from concrete particulars, those instances are complex entities. Realists have a layer cake analysis of property-instances, nominalists a blob view. This insight is not original with me. Over thirty-five years ago, Herbert Hochberg noted that "The use of [property] instances is significant only when used as a nominalistic gambit. . . . The instances are themselves disguised combinations of a bare particular and a universal and are complex, not simple. Two instances of white, like two white patches, have something in common and yet differ numerically."²⁵

Earlier I mentioned that Bergmann charged Husserl with being a nominalist. Bergmann's analysis of Husserl on this score is characteristically obscure, at least for those of us not from Iowa. But the main reason for Bergmann's accusation is precisely the alleged simplicity of Husserlian moments: "[T]here is nothing in the item [i.e., moment] to make it *this* or *that*, or the *first* or the *second*. . . . Objectively, this second [i.e., individuating] component is redundant. Negatively, it merely reminds us that in the context 'red' does not stand for a universal."²⁶ With this background in mind, let us examine the debate about Husserlian moments.

HUSSERLIAN MOMENTS: BLOBS OR LAYER-CAKES

Are Husserlian moments such as red₁ blobs or are they layer-cakes? Let us call these two options the Simplicity and Complexity view, respectively. On the

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Simplicity view, red_1 is a structureless entity with no properties or relations within it.²⁷ Moments turn out to be inseparable tropes. On the Complexity view, red_1 contains the universal redness, the nexus of exemplification, and an individuator, most likely a bare particular. I believe Husserlian moments are layer-cakes and to show this I shall try to rebut three main arguments for the Simplicity view and offer one argument for the Complexity position.

1. Critique of the Simplicity View

Three main arguments have been proffered on behalf of the simplicity view:²⁸

- a. *Argument one:* According to Husserl, we can concentrate our attention on the-green-of-the-tree before us while being unaware of its individualizing aspects. In this case, the-green-of-another-tree could be substituted for the-green-of-this-tree and we would not notice the difference. Still, inattention to the individuality of the-green-of-this-tree does not remove its individuality. It is a particular and not a universal and, as such, it is a simple entity which exists here and now, a moment of green.²⁹
- b. *Argument two:* Each geometrical fragmentation of, say, a green surface has its own green. Otherwise, we could not talk about the spread of a color over a surface. Thus, each fragmentation has its own green— green_1 , green_2 , . . . , and these are simple particulars called moments.³⁰
- c. *Argument three:* The third argument is an argument from perception. It comes in at least two different forms both of which proceed in two steps. In the first step it is claimed that moments, like red_1 , can be the objects of normal acts of perception. In such acts, we see something particular that is located in space and time. The color we see and everything about it is spatio-temporal. Indeed, what we see with our very eyes is always located in space and time. Thus, the color we see is not a complex entity with two abstract entities (redness, exemplification) as constituents. Rather, it is a simple, viz., a moment. Advocates of both forms of the argument

²⁷For present purposes, I set aside the fact that for Husserl, red_1 would contain hue, intensity, saturation, and being a color.

²⁸Examples of these arguments may be found in Reinhardt Grossmann, *The Categorical Structure of the World* (Bloomington: The Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 107-8; *The Existence of the World*, pp. 30-45; Wolfgang Künne, "Criteria of Abstractness. The Ontologies of Husserl, Frege, and Strawson against the Backdrop of Classical Metaphysics," in *Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, ed. Barry Smith

(Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1982), pp. 401-437; James Alan Talvite, "Properties and Things," (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1977); Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, "Truth Makers," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 44 (March 1984): 287-321.

²⁹Cf. *LI Vol I*, pp. 376-77.

³⁰Cf. *LI Vol I*, pp. 377.

³¹Cf. Mulligan, Simons, and Smith, "Truth Makers": 304-308.

³²Cf. Grossmann, *The Existence of the World*, pp. 33-35.

appear to be in agreement about the first step, but there are different moves made from here.

Some state step two in this way:³¹ Foes of moments must counter the argument of step one by replacing moments with universals, independent particulars, and exemplification. For two reasons, this strategy fails. For one thing, it does not provide an adequate account of cases where we clearly seem to see moments themselves. Second, it often involves the absurd claim that we can see the universal in the concrete particular that somehow contains it, while maintaining at the same time that the universal remains outside space and time.

There is an alternative version of step two:³² If someone tries to combine a commitment to universals as abstract objects with a belief in moments, then the most plausible depiction of our knowledge of universals entails that moments are simples. Once this is done, the argument continues, the slide to nominalism is hard to avoid because "universals" become redundant and, in any case, they turn out to be mere abstract objects like sets or perfect particulars and not true universals, because they are no longer taken as multiply exemplifiable entities in their instances. What is the most plausible depiction of our knowledge of universals to which reference was just made? It is the view that upon seeing a red moment, the mind "turns elsewhere" so to speak and through eidetic intuition it "perceives" the universal that remains entirely outside the moment. Reinhardt Grossmann combines this depiction with a Platonic judgmental view of ordinary perception (e.g., to perceive a red ball is to perceptually judge that the ball is red and this presupposes an intuition of the relevant universal), but this later commitment is not essential to the argument.

Now, what does the perception argument have to do with Husserl? If successful, the argument shows that moments are simples. Once this is granted, universals become otiose and, in fact, they are no longer multiply exemplifiable entities. Husserl may not have seen this in the early stages of his thought, but he should have and, in any case, his slide towards nominalism is already underway with his introduction of moments.

Since I believe this last argument is the strongest of the three, I shall focus on it after offering a brief response to arguments one and two. There is a similarity in the first two arguments and a general response can be given to them. Simply put, phrases like the-F-of-a are ambiguous and the mere presence of such phrases does little to show that their referents are simple entities. For example, phrases like the-F-of-a can be a way of referring to the universal F-ness in a as opposed to some other property of a.

Second, the-F-of-a can refer to a moment taken as a complex entity, e.g., redness, a tie of exemplification, and a bare particular. According to most realists,

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when a universal is exemplified by a particular to form a complex entity, then this complex entity is itself a particular. Similarly, if a universal is exemplified by a spatio-temporal entity, the complex whole that is formed is itself spatio-temporal. The universal is “in” the complex whole, but this relation is not itself a spatio-temporal one nor is at least one of the entities (the universal) it relates. Thus, the complex moment, red_1 , can be a spatio-temporal particular while two of its constituents remain abstract.

So Husserl’s arguments regarding moments can be granted without implying that moments like red_1 , or $green_1$, are simple. Moments can be complex and his arguments could still hold. For example, two moments on the same surface, $green_1$, and $green_2$, are both particular and are not identical to each other even though the greenness *in* each is an identical constituent in both. By way of application to the issues in focus in argument one, Husserl could be making the simple point that a moment does not become a species by ignoring its particularity. Husserl could still consistently hold that the greenness in each green moment is a universal constituent in those moments, without denying that the moments themselves are numerically distinct particulars. Argument two can be handled in the same sort of way.

What can be said in response to the argument from perception? First, it is false to say that someone who rejects a blob depiction of moments must replace them with universals, independent particulars, and exemplification. The layer-cake position embraces complex moments in addition to independent particulars and universals. The false dichotomy presented above arises from a failure to consider a complexity analysis of moments.

Second, did Husserl believe that we could “see universals with our very eyes?” This phrase is ambiguous, but I take it to mean that while focusing one’s attention on a moment, one can directly perceive the universal in the moment. The direct perception of a universal is, on this view, a different mental act from an ordinary perception of a moment, but it in no way involves attending to something outside the moment itself. Indeed, it is while the eyes are on the moment that the universal is originally given as a constituent of the moment in eidetic intuition.

Given this interpretation, it seems that Husserl did, in fact, believe one could see a universal with one’s very eyes (if, of course, a visual quality is in view). There are five aspects of eidetic intuition and its relationship to ordinary sensuous perception of a particular relevant to our discussion:

- (i) The universal itself is ‘in’—though not spatially in—the moment.³³
- (ii) We directly perceive the universal via eidetic intuition. Eidetic intuition is precisely parallel to ordinary perception in that through an eidetic intuition the

³³*LI Vol. I*, pp. 332, 337, 340; *LI Vol. II*, pp. 441, 446-447, 453; *Ideas I*, pp. 7-8. Cf. *LI Vol. II*, pp. 773-815.

³⁴*LI Vol. I*, pp. 340, 357, 361, 379; *Ideas I*, p. xxi.

³⁵*LI Vol. I*, pp. 337, 340, 357, 389, 390-391.

³⁶*LI Vol. I*, pp. 337, 357, 383.

³⁷*LI Vol. I*, pp. 337, 339-340, 357, 377, 379; *LI Vol. II*, p. 482; *Ideas I*, pp. 8, 25.

- universal is directly perceived, it is placed immediately before the subject.³⁴
- (iii) Compared to the ordinary perception of a particular, eidetic intuition is a new mode of apprehension. While founded on ordinary perception, eidetic intuition has its own unique act character, and as it is directed to the moment itself (or, perhaps, the concrete particular), though in an essentially different manner than in ordinary perception, the universal is placed before the subject.³⁵
 - (iv) The (visual) universal is perceived with the eyes while looking at the moment itself (or, perhaps, the concrete particular).³⁶
 - (v) The universal is not only in the moment, it is also perceived in the moment and perceived to be in the moment.³⁷

Statements expressing (i)-(v) are peppered throughout the *Investigations* and the relevant sections of the *Ideas I*. It may be that Husserl abandoned this view of eidetic intuition later in his life, and it may be that there is some sort of absurdity in (i)-(v), but it seems clear at this stage of his thought that (i)-(v) accurately express his view of the matter.

But what about the claim that this view is, in fact, absurd? Perhaps there is a sort of argument from queerness to the effect that even if Husserl held to this position, he should not have done so because of the highly counterintuitive nature of the position itself.

Now, I am not among those philosophers who dismiss wholesale any argument from queerness. However, such arguments seem to be more effective when the goal of their employment is for one to be justified in some belief as opposed to showing one is justified to a critic. The former epistemic task may require rebutting a critic while the latter requires refuting the critic. What is a critic to do except to try to show that the queerness represents a misunderstanding of some sort? With this in mind, I have two responses, one phenomenological, one ontological, that I hope will weaken the alleged counter-intuitiveness of Husserl's position.

Phenomenologically, if a philosopher claims to have a direct awareness of some entity, another philosopher can always claim not to have that awareness. When G. E. Moore claimed to have a direct intuition of goodness, his rivals simply denied they had the same intuition. A defender of Moore could respond in this way. Goodness is a second order property like being colored or being shaped, not a first order property like pleasure, being red, or being triangular. Now intuitions of first order properties such as these have a certain texture or vivacity that is absent in the case of intuitions of the corresponding second order properties. Those who failed to have the relevant intuition of goodness were looking for the sort of intuitive texture appropriate to intuition of a first-order property and they never found it. Unfortunately, they were looking for the wrong sort of phenome-

nology. Once an intuition of goodness is compared to the intuition of other second order properties, it becomes more plausible to think that the relevant intuition is real.

Now I think the same sort of thing may be going on regarding eidetic intuition. Husserl himself warned against depicting eidetic intuition as a feeling of conviction, tainted with a certain affective coloring.³⁸ The reason some philosophers may find absurd the claim that in eidetic intuition one has an intuition of an abstract object non-spatio-temporally 'in' a moment while looking at that moment is that they fail to find the relevant affective coloring. But if eidetic intuition is real it is wrong to look for such coloring and it is also wrong to compare the phenomenology of eidetic intuition with the more vivid nature of a sensory perception of a moment.

If the charge of absurdity is ontological, then it probably amounts to the claim that it just seems absurd to think that one can see an abstract object while looking at a moment in space and time. By way of response, let us recall the modal distinction introduced by Francis Suarez. Suarez says the modal distinction intervenes between an entity and its mode. He illustrates this by saying that the modal distinction obtains between the property known as quantity and the-inherence-of-quantity-in-a-specific-substance. A mode is a dependent, inseparable, genuinely distinct entity from what it is a mode of. If a modal distinction obtains between two entities A and B (where B is a mode), there is non-identity between A and B and inseparability in this sense: A can exist without B but not vice versa.

Given Suarez' description, it is easy to see a modal distinction between a property and its property-instance taken as a complex moment. Now when one attends to a moment, one attends to something precisely as a spatio-temporal particular. But when one attends to the universal in the moment, one attends to a property simpliciter. When a perceiver is inclined to describe his experience with language appropriate to a particular, e.g., by noting the location of the object, then the relevant object is the moment. But when the perceiver describes the object in terms of property talk, e.g., this object is bright red, it is darker than orange, it is a color, then no reference is being made at all to space, time, or particularity. Moreover, it is because the universal is directly present that one is able to describe it with the relevant property-talk. When one is tempted to say that the universal is also located right here and now, he is now attending to the universal's mode, the moment, whether or not he realizes it.

I recognize this response will not satisfy everyone. In any case, the arguments for the Simplicity view do not seem compelling. In the remainder of this essay, I shall present one argument that, if successful, establishes the Complexity position.

³⁸*Ideas I*, pp. 39-40.

³⁹For more on the difference between containing properties by a bare particular vs. having them tied to a bare particular, see J. P.

Moreland, "Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 79 (1998): 251-263.

2. An Argument for the Complexity Position

Recall that on the Simplicity view, a moment does not need to be individuated because its particularity is primitive. Its particularity and intrinsic nature differ by a distinction of reason and, given a denial of universal entities in the moment, no grounding of particularity is required. The same cannot be said for the Complexity position. On this view, a moment has at least two constituents that are universals, e.g., redness and exemplification, so some account must be offered of what makes the moment a particular. Thus, the very act of providing such an account entails the Complexity view.

Husserl's most important comments about individuation and ultimate substrates are found in sections 11-15 (especially 11 and 14) of book I, part I chapter I of *Ideas I*. Husserl discusses genus/species relations and different hierarchies of being. In terms similar to those used by Aristotle, Husserl argues that as one ascends to higher and higher levels of universals, one eventually reaches *summa genera*. In descending, one finally reaches ultimate, formless substrates. These substrates are "pure, syntactically formless, individual single particulars." He also tells us that these substrates are basic entities that cannot be broken down further, they are uncombined individuals, i.e., not composed of properties or parts, and they cannot be derived by applying predicates to other entities. I take this to mean that they do not have properties contained within them, though for Husserl, these substrates will always have properties connected to them because on his view, they are not self-sufficient and they are always found with properties.³⁹

On a few occasions, Husserl describes these ultimate substrates by using the Aristotelian notion of *tode ti*, which for Aristotle has as its primary meaning something indivisible and one in number (*Cat.* 3b 10-14). Aristotle used *tode ti* to refer to forms, primary substances, or prime matter. Husserl's main use of *tode ti* is to refer to an ultimate subject of predication that is itself formless and particular. His description of a *tode ti* reminds one of a bare particular for Gustav Bergmann which, Bergmann claimed, was Aristotelian prime matter splintered.

In one very interesting passage, Husserl compares an ultimate substrate with a moment. He points out that an ultimate substrate is an "uncombined individuum," i.e. something particular. Then he says this: "The quality-moment in itself 'has no individuality.' Is it accordingly an *essence*?" The passage is difficult to understand. But Husserl seems to be saying that a moment needs to have an ultimate substrate in it which is its ultimate subject of predication and which grounds its individuation. By "quality-moment in itself" Husserl seems to mean the quality-moment as quality. Thus, red₁ in so far as it is red is not particular. No account of individuation is given if we simply consider red₁ qua red.

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Unfortunately Husserl's views here are a bit unclear in just the same way Aristotle was unclear. Aristotle was unclear about the form-instance relation. For example, in the category of substance, statements like "Socrates is a man" may contain an ungrounded "is" of classification that places a primary substance (Socrates) in a class, the secondary substance. Or Aristotle may ground this "is" in a more basic relation involving the predication of the form, humanity, of the matter in Socrates. The former represents a reading of Aristotle that is compatible with the Simplicity view since, on this reading, Socrates is a simple, particular entity (disregarding accidents) and the universal, humanity, is like one of Nicholas Wolterstorff's kinds, viz. not something in the instance but something to which the instance belongs.⁴⁰ The latter is more in keeping with the Complexity view since, on this reading, Socrates is a complex entity with these constituents (disregarding accidents): the universal, humanity, the individuating matter in Socrates, and the nexus of exemplification.

It seems to me that Husserl is somewhat unclear in the same way. But his comments about individuation and ultimate substrates do seem to imply the Complexity view even if Husserl's explicit statements are not as clear as one would wish. For on the Simplicity view, moments come individuated in and of themselves. The Simplicity view rejects the constituent-whole framework in its treatment of a moment as a simple. Thus, the problem of individuation does not even arise. Only the Complexity view requires some sort of ultimate substrate to ground the individuation of moments, and the fact that Husserl links individuation with such substrates implies that he accepts the constituent-whole framework for moments. And this is nothing other than the Complexity view.⁴¹

⁴⁰See Nicholas Wolterstorff, *On Universals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). For a critique, see J. P. Moreland, "How to Be a Nominalist in Realist

Clothing," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 39 (Summer, 1991): 75-101.

⁴¹I wish to thank Dallas Willard for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.