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few years ago, Christian philosopher Paul Moser wrote an important article in which he distinguished two different approaches to Christian scholarship—the discussion and the obedience modes. The typical academic approach is the discussion mode according to which the scholar loves the intellectual stimulation of asking questions, having intellectual dialogs and engaging in the quest for clarity, all from the perspective of a disengaged academic posture wherein the conversation and the prestige that comes from engaging in it are ends in themselves. By contrast, the obedience mode is done under the Lordship of Jesus, and has as its goal obedience to His love commands with a special view towards providing help, faith and encouragement for brothers and sisters in the church (along with aid for those outside the faith in coming to Jesus). Moser rightly points out that the obedience mode—not the discussion mode—is the correct posture for the Christian and I want to argue in this paper that such a posture is of crucial importance today when it comes to adopting and assessing our views on various topics in light of their impact on whether or not the central teachings of Christianity and key Vineyard distinctives are viewed as items of knowledge.

It is on the basis of knowledge (or perceived knowledge)—not faith, commitment or sincerity—that people are given the right to lead, act in public and accomplish important tasks. We give certain people the right to fix our cars, pull our teeth, write our contracts and so on, because we take those people to be in possession of the relevant body of knowledge. Moreover, it is the possession of knowledge (and, more specifically, the knowledge that one has knowledge), and not mere truth alone, that gives people confidence and courage to lead, act and risk. Accordingly, it is of crucial importance that we promote the central teachings of Christianity in general, and the Kingdom distinctives of the Vineyard in particular, as a body of knowledge and not as a set of faith-practices to be accepted on the basis of mere belief or a shared narrative alone. To fail at this point is to risk being marginalized and disregarded as those promoting a privatized set of feelings or desires that fall short of knowledge.

Unfortunately, the contemporary cultural *milieu*—inside and outside the church—in which we live and move and have our being is precisely one with a plausibility structure that takes healing prayer, hearing from God, deliverance from the demonic and related matters to be on the order of astrology or the Flat Earth Society. This is one reason why we have had difficulty getting our distinctives to be taken seriously in the academy, the broader community and the church. And it is why they are often practiced in an unstable, and sometimes fleshly, way among our churches.

In 1983, Os Guinness wrote a book in which he claimed that the church had become its own gravedigger.<sup>2</sup> The upshot of Guinness's claim was that the very things that were bringing short-term growth in the Christian community also were, unintentionally and imperceptibly, sowing the very sorts of ideas that would eventually undercut the church's distinctive power and authority. The so-called gravedigger does not hurt the church on purpose. Usually well intentioned, he or she simply adopts views or practices that are counterproductive to and undermining of a vibrant, attractive Christian community. In my view, there are certain contemporary currents of thought that risk undercutting distinctive Vineyard Kingdom practices. I want to get these on the table to expose how harmful these currents are for us in the Vineyard in particular. To accomplish my goal, I shall, first, clarify the nature of knowledge; second, identify the nature of a plausibility structure along with the central plausibility structure constituting our contemporary milieu; third, identify three intellectual areas that, if embraced, run the risk of turning us into our own gravediggers.

### The Nature of Knowledge

Here's a simple definition of knowledge: It is to represent reality in thought or experience the way it really is on the basis of adequate grounds. To know something (the nature of cancer, forgiveness, God) is to think of or experience it as it really is on a solid basis of evidence, experience, intuition, and so forth. Little can be said in general about what counts as "adequate grounds." The best one can do is to start with specific cases of knowledge and its absence in art, chemistry, memory, scripture, logic, and formulate helpful descriptions of "adequate grounds" accordingly.


Please note that *knowledge has nothing to do with certainty or an anxious quest for it.* One can know something without being certain about it and in the

presence of doubt or the admission that one might be wrong. Recently, I know that God spoke to me about a specific matter but I admit it is possible I am wrong about this (though, so far, I have no good reason to think I am wrong). When Paul says, "This you know with certainty" (Ephesians 5:5), he clearly implies that one can know without certainty; otherwise, the statement would be redundant. Why? If I say, "Give me a burger with pickles on it," I imply that it is possible to have a burger without pickles. If, contrary to fact, pickles were simply essential ingredients of burgers, it would be redundant to ask for burgers with pickles. The parallel to "knowledge with certainty" should be easy to see. When Christians claim to have knowledge of this or that, for example, that God is real, that Jesus rose from the dead, that the Bible is the word of God, they are not saying that there is no possibility that they could be wrong, that they have no doubts, or that they have answers to every question raised against them. They are simply saying that these and other claims satisfy the definition given above.

The deepest issue facing the church today is this: Are its main creeds and central teachings items of knowledge or mere matters of blind faith, privatized personal beliefs, issues of feeling to be accepted or set aside according to the individual or cultural pressures that come and go? Do these teachings have cognitive and behavioral authority that set a worldview framework for approaching science, art, ethics—indeed, all of life? Or is cognitive and behavioral authority set by what scientists or the American Psychiatric Association say, by what Gallup polls tell us is embraced by cultural and intellectual elites. Do we turn to these sources and then set aside or revise two thousand years of Christian thinking and doctrinal/creedal expressions in order to make Christian teaching acceptable to the neuroscience department at UCLA? The question of whether or not Christianity provides its followers with a range of knowledge is no small matter. It is a question of authority for life and death, and lay brothers and sisters are watching Christian thinkers and leaders to see how we approach this matter.

### The Importance of a Plausibility Structure

Take a look at this diagram and notice what you see:



Notice that the right horizontal line looks longer than the one on the left even though their lengths are the same. Why? Because we see these shapes hundreds of times a day (the right diagram is the inside corner of a room; the left is the outside corner of a building), we are unconsciously used to seeing them as three-dimensional objects, and so we unconsciously try to adjust to the two-dimensionality of the figures on the page. In this case, our habits of perception and thought shape (note: they don't completely determine, they just shape) what we see. When this diagram is shown to people in primitive cultures with no square or rectangular buildings, they have no such subconscious habits and they see the horizontal lines accurately as being of equal length.

There's an important lesson in this. A culture has a set of background assumptions—we can call it a plausibility structure—that sets a tone, a framework, for what people think, to what they are willing to listen and evaluate, how they feel and how they act. This plausibility structure is so widespread and subtle that people usually don't even know it is there even though it hugely impacts their perspective on the world. The plausibility structure can be composed of thoughts (scientists are smart; religious people are gullible and dumb), symbols (burning the flag, a picture of Jane Fonda, tattoos), music, and so forth. For example, a book published with Oxford University Press will be taken by a reader to be more credible and to exhibit greater scholarship than a book by NavPress, even though this assumption is clearly false in certain cases. Again, if you walk on campus at say, the University of Southern California and Biola University, the age differences, the buildings, the relative size of the libraries, the fact that USC professors appear more frequently on news programs than do Biola professors will create a background tone that USC classes are more intellectually substantial and a USC education is more intellectually rigorous than one at Biola.

Here's the problem this raises for trust in God. Without even knowing it, we all carry with us this cultural map, this background set of assumptions, and our self talk, the things that form our default beliefs (ones we naturally accept without argument), the things we are embarrassed to believe (if they run contrary to the authorities in our map), and related matters create a natural set of doubts about Christianity. Most of these factors are things of which people are not even aware. In fact, if they are brought to one's attention, one would most likely disown them even though, in fact, they are the internalized ideas that actually shape what people do and don't believe. Our current Western cultural plausibility structure elevates science and scorns and mocks religion, especially

Christian teaching. As a result, believers in Western cultures do not as readily believe the supernatural worldview of the Bible in comparison with their Third World brothers and sisters. As Christian anthropologist Charles Kraft observes,

In comparison to other societies, Americans and other North Atlantic peoples are *naturalistic*. Non-Western peoples are frequently concerned about the activities of supernatural beings. Though many Westerners retain a vague belief in God, most deny that other supernatural beings even exist. The wide-ranging supernaturalism of most of the societies of the world is absent for most of our people....Our focus is on the natural world, with little or no attention paid to the supernatural world.<sup>3</sup>

There is a straightforward application here for evangelism. A person's plausibility structure is the set of ideas the person either is or is not willing to entertain as possibly true. For example, no one would come to a lecture defending a flat earth because this idea is just not part of our plausibility structure. We cannot even entertain the idea. Moreover, a person's plausibility structure is a function of the beliefs he or she already has. Applied to evangelism, J. Gresham Machen got it right when he said:

God usually exerts that power in connection with certain prior conditions of the human mind, and it should be ours to create, so far as we can, with the help of God, those favorable conditions for the reception of the gospel. False ideas are the greatest obstacles to the reception of the gospel. We may preach with all the fervor of a reformer and yet succeed only in winning a straggler here and there, if we permit the whole collective thought of the nation or of the world to be controlled by ideas which, by the resistless force of logic, prevent Christianity from being regarded as anything more than a harmless delusion.<sup>4</sup>

The simple truth is that ideas have consequences. If a culture reaches the point where Christian claims are not even part of its plausibility structure, fewer and fewer people will be able to entertain the possibility that they might be true. Whatever stragglers do come to faith in such a context would do so on the basis of felt needs alone, and the genuineness of such conversions would be questionable to say the least. This is why apologetics is so crucial to evangelism. It seeks to create a plausibility structure in a person's mind, "favorable

conditions" as Machen put it, so the gospel can be entertained by a person. To plant a seed in someone's mind in pre-evangelism is to present a person with an idea that will work on his or her plausibility structure to create a space in which Christianity can be entertained seriously. If this is important to evangelism, it is strategically crucial that local churches think about how they can address those aspects of the contemporary worldview that place Christianity (and Vineyard distinctives) outside the plausibility structures of so many.

Since the 1930s, the dominant worldview in American culture is scientific naturalism.<sup>5</sup> People give doctors much more authority than pastors because doctors deal with facts, truth and knowledge and pastors traffic in beliefs, private feelings and, well, "meaning." Scientific naturalism has two central facets to it. First, the naturalist ontology entails that within the space-time physical universe everything is or is necessarily dependent on matter which, in turn, is best described in the language of chemistry and physics. This means, most likely, that consciousness is identical to physical states in the brain and that there is no such thing as "the souls of men and beasts" as it used to be put. Science and science along has the authority to tell us what is real. Second, the naturalist epistemology is some form of scientism according to which science is our only or ideal way of knowing reality and all other approaches fall short of providing knowledge. This means that theology, biblical teaching and ethics are not cognitive domains that present us with genuine knowledge of their subject matter. Instead, these fields represent expressions of feeling or private beliefs and a mindless form of tolerance is to govern dialog within them.

It should be clear that naturalism is not consistent with biblical Christianity. If that's true, then the church should do all it can to undermine the worldview of naturalism and to promote, among other things, the cognitive, alethic nature of theology, biblical teaching and ethics. This means that when Christians consider adopting certain views widely accepted in the culture, they must factor into their consideration whether or not such adoption would enhance naturalism's hegemony and help dig the church's own grave by contributing to a hostile, undermining plausibility structure.

Consider as an example the abandonment of belief in the historical reality of Adam and Eve. Now if someone does not believe Adam and Eve were real historical individuals, then so be it. However, my present concern is not with the truth or falsity of the historical view. Rather, my concern is the readiness, sometimes eagerness, of some to set aside the traditional view, the ease with which the real estate of historical Christian commitments is abandoned, the

unintended consequences of jettisoning such a belief. Given the current plausibility structure set by scientific naturalism, rejecting the historical Adam and Eve contributes to the marginalization of Christian teaching in the public square and in the church and thereby those who reject Adam and Eve unintentionally undermine the church. How so?

*First*, the rejection reinforces the idea that science and science alone is competent to get at the real truth of reality; theology and biblical teaching are not up to this task. If historically consistent understandings of biblical teaching conflict with what most scientists claim, then so much the worst for those understandings.

Second, the rejection reinforces the privatized non-cognitive status of biblical doctrine, ethics and practices—especially supernatural ones that need to be construed as knowledge if they are to be passed on to others with integrity and care. Since the church has been mistaken about one of its central teachings for two thousand years, why should we trust the church regarding its teaching about extra-marital sex or the veracity of the gift of prophesy? Admittedly, the history of the church is not infallible in its teachings; still, to the degree that its central teachings through the ages are revised, to that degree the non-revised teachings are undermined in their cognitive and religious authority. The non-revised teachings become more tentative.

Finally, the rejection reinforces the modernist notion that we are individuals, cut off from out diachronic community, and we are free to adopt our beliefs and practices in disregard of that community and our adoption's impact on it.

If I am right about the broader issues, then the rejection of an historical Adam and Eve has far more troubling implications than those that surface in trying to reinterpret certain biblical texts. The very status of biblical, theological and ethical teachings as knowledge is at stake in the current cultural milieu as is the church's cognitive marginalization to a place outside the culture's plausibility structure. Those who reject an historical Adam and Eve, inadvertently, harm the church.

### Three Things to Avoid if You Don't Want to Become a Gravedigger

I suspect that most Vineyard folks still accept an historical Adam and Eve. But there are three areas of reflection that involve views that may be more acceptable to Vineyard people that, in my view, seriously undermine the

plausibility of Christian teaching in general, and supernatural practices in particular.

Theistic Evolution. It is widely acknowledged that evolutionary theory, to be clarified in more detail shortly, has "made the world safe for atheists" as Richard Dawkins put it. While evolutionary theory does not entail the falsehood of an interventionist Christian God, the latter is much less plausible given the former than it is given a rejection of general evolutionary theory. Thus, former Cornell biologist William Provine proclaimed:

Let me summarize my views on what modern evolutionary biology tells us loud and clear....There are no gods, no purposes, no goal-directed forces of any kind. There is no life after death...There is no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning, and no free will for humans, either.<sup>6</sup>

It can hardly be doubted that the impact of evolutionary theory is its significant contribution to the secularization of culture, a shift that places a supernatural God who heals, speaks, and so on outside the plausibility structure of Western society. In light of that, why would any Christian want to flirt with theistic evolution? There are three general understandings of evolution: change within limits (microevolution), the thesis of common descent, and the blind watchmaker thesis. The first is accepted by everyone, the second is not yet established and the third seems to me to be wildly implausible, especially given Christian theism as a background belief. Why? Because the blind watchmaker thesis is the idea that solely blind, mechanical, efficient causal processes are sufficient to produce all the life we see without any need or room for a god to be involved in the process, and there are good reasons to reject this thesis. Recently, even the atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel has weighed in on the matter and claimed that this Darwinian thesis is implausible. Theistic evolution is the view that the blind watchmaker thesis is true, there is no scientifically detectable evidence for God being involved in the process of evolution (remember: theistic evolutionists are committed to methodological naturalism), and we are free to reject metaphysical naturalism even though we accept methodological naturalism while doing science.

What theistic evolutionists do is to fail to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting metaphysical naturalism, given that "we have no need of that (the God) hypothesis" in any of the sciences. Why be a theist in the first place? After all,

while evolution is logically consistent with theism, there is nothing in evolution that would lead one *to* theism, and if "the God hypothesis" isn't needed until humans appear, it is less credible to think it is needed subsequently. Given (1) the presence of a very vibrant, intellectually sophisticated interdisciplinary Intelligent Design movement, (2) the atheistic implications that most naturally follow from accepting general evolutionary theory (and many, perhaps most draw those implications), and (3) the fact that the blind watchmaker thesis is far from being justified, why would a Vineyard supernaturalist want to embrace something that undermines the plausibility of our Vineyard practices, practices that embrace a supernaturalist "interventionist" God?

If science has shown that since the Big Bang until the emergence of *homo sapiens*, there is no good reason to believe in such a God, isn't it special pleading to embrace this Deity when it comes to demons, prophesy and so forth? Surely, science, e.g., psychology, has, under the same methodological naturalist constraints, "shown" that demon possession is nothing but a psychological disorder, and religious experience is just psychological projection. It seems to me that these latter naturalizations of Vineyard distinctives are more consistent with theistic evolution (e.g., they both adopt methodological naturalism, they both place religion is a non-cognitive upper story of faith) than with Intelligent Design.

If we want to be consistent and to contend that our supernatural activities are, indeed, items of supernatural knowledge, it seems to me that we should not let the naturalist camel's nose under the tent from the Big Bang up to the appearance of human life. Clearly, if we need to postulate an active God to explain the origin and development of life, as Intelligent Design advocates claim, then before we step into the door of a Vineyard service, we are already warranted in believing supernaturalism, and Vineyard practices fit easily in our worldview. But if we come to church as theistic evolutionists, a supernatural interpretation of Vineyard practices is less at home in our worldview and, indeed, may fairly be called *ad hoc*.

Neuroscience and the soul. The great Presbyterian scholar J. Gresham Machen once observed: "I think we ought to hold not only that man has a soul, but that it is important that he should know that he has a soul." From a Christian perspective, this is a trustworthy saying. Christianity is a dualist, interactionist religion in this sense: God, angels/demons, and the souls of men and beasts are immaterial substances that can causally interact with the world. Specifically, human persons are (or have) souls that are spiritual substances that ground personal identity in a disembodied intermediate state between death and

final resurrection.<sup>9</sup> Clearly, this was the Pharisees' view in Intertestamental Judaism, and Jesus (Matthew 22:23-33; cf. Matthew 10:28) and Paul (Acts 23 6-10; cf. II Corinthians 12:1-4) side with the Pharisees on this issue over against the Sadducees.<sup>10</sup> In my view, Christian physicalism involves a politically correct revision of the biblical text that fails to be convincing.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, today, many hold that, while broadly logically possible, dualism is no longer plausible in light of advances in modern science. This attitude is becoming increasingly prominent in Christian circles. Thus, Christian philosopher Nancey Murphy claims that physicalism is not primarily a philosophical thesis, but the hard core of a scientific research program for which there is ample evidence. This evidence consists in the fact that "biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science have provided accounts of the dependence on physical processes of *specific* faculties once attributed to the soul." Dualism cannot be *proven* false—a dualist can always appeal to correlations or functional relations between soul and brain/body--but advances in science make it a view with little justification. According to Murphy, "science has provided a massive amount of evidence suggesting that we need not postulate the existence of an entity such as a soul or mind in order to explain life and consciousness." <sup>13</sup>

I cannot undertake here a critique of physicalism and a defense of dualism. Suffice it to say that dualism is a widely accepted, vibrant intellectual position. I suspect that the majority of Christian philosophers are dualists. And it is important to mention that neuroscience really has nothing to do with which view is most plausible. Without getting into details, this becomes evident when we observe that leading neuroscientists—Nobel Prize winner John Eccles, U. C. L. A. neuroscientist Jeffrey Schwartz, and Mario Beaureguard, are all dualists and they know the neuroscience. Their dualism, and the central intellectual issues involved in the debate, are quite independent of neuroscientific data.

The irrelevance of neuroscience also becomes evident when we consider the recent best seller *Proof of Heaven* by Eben Alexander. Regardless of one's view of the credibility of Near Death Experiences (NDEs) in general, or of Alexander's in particular, one thing is clear. Before whatever it was that happened to him, Alexander believed the (allegedly) standard neuroscientific view that specific regions of the brain generate and possess specific states of conscious. But after his NDE, Alexander came to believe that it is the soul that possesses consciousness, not the brain, and the various mental states of the soul are in two-way causal interaction with specific regions of the brain. Here's the point: His change in viewpoint was a change in metaphysics that did not require

him to reject or alter a single neuroscientific fact. Dualism and physicalism are empirically equivalent views consistent with all and only the same scientific data. Thus, the authority of empirical data in science cannot be claimed on either side.

Given this, and given the fact that Jesus believed in a soul as did the other biblical writers, it is hard to see why Vineyard believers would reject dualism in favor of some form of Christian physicalism. Moreover, loss of belief in the soul has contributed to a loss of belief in life after death. As John Hick pointed out, "This considerable decline within society as a whole, accompanied by a lesser decline within the churches, of the belief in personal immortality clearly reflects the assumption within our culture that we should only believe in what we experience, plus what the accredited sciences certify to us." <sup>15</sup>

What is the motive, the reasoning here for those in the Vineyard who reject dualism? If the church's teaching on this has been wrong for two thousand years, why should we believe her teaching when it comes to demons, prophesy and so on? As with theistic evolution's accommodationism, physicalism accedes to science a hegemony it does not deserve. And this is not just some outspoken dualist's opinion, either!

For example, the overstatement of neuroscience's authority is increasingly recognized from various sources, including some neuroscientists. As Alissa Quart's Op-Ed in the *New York Times* observes, "Writing in the journal *Neuron*, the researchers concluded that 'logically irrelevant neuroscience information imbues an argument with authoritative, scientific credibility.' Another way of saying this is that bogus science gives vague, undisciplined thinking the look of seriousness and truth."<sup>16</sup>

Here's the important takeaway: Such irrelevant appeals to neuroscientific authority undermine the view that theology, biblical teaching and commonsense views of the mind, relationships and so on can stand on their own without the need for scientific backing. Such appeals reinforce the non-cognitive nature of theology and biblical teaching, and they contribute to the placement of Vineyard practices outside the culture's plausibility structure. It seems inconsistent and *ad hoc* to allow science to revise theological anthropology while not allowing it to do the same regarding demonization and religious experience.

Doctrine and ethics. As I have admitted earlier, the history of the church's teaching is not infallible. Still, we should be very careful and reluctant to revise what the church has held for centuries, especially when two factors are present: (1) There is an intellectually robust defense of the traditional view currently available; (2) there is politically correct pressure suddenly to "find" that the Bible

all along taught what our secular friends and peers tell us it should teach if we are going to be culturally and academically respectable. There is a sobermindedness that should accompany any self-identifying Christian scholars and pastors regarding these matters, since our laity often look to us or consider us as representative spokespersons of the Christian tradition. To many laypeople, it seems hardly a coincidence that just when the culture puts pressure on us to believe that P, even though the history of biblical interpretation supports ~P, we conveniently discover that we have misunderstood the scriptures all along!

I think the Christian community expects more courage out of its leaders than this, and we run the risk of making our own desired views of biblical interpretation more authoritative than the text itself. It is as though some exegetes have a desired view they want to sustain, and they fiddle with the Bible until they get it to turn out the "right" way. It has always seemed to me that revisions of the church's teaching about the role of women in the church and the morality of homosexuality are suspicious in just this way. I am not arguing that the current revisionist views are false, though I believe that to be the case. What I am urging us to consider is the unintended consequences of embracing the revisionist positions—the marginalization of Christian doctrine and ethics (after all, if we "find" the church was wrong for two thousand years at just the time when it is convenient to make such a discovery, what does this say about the epistemic and alethic status of the views we just happened not to have revised at present) and the placement of Christianity outside the plausibility structure.

None of my comments is meant to promote a bounded set by which we decide insiders and outsiders. For example, in my view, theistic evolutionists are dear brothers and sisters who belong just as much as I hope I do. Still, ideas have consequences. As I have said earlier, if someone believes the revised views to be true, then so be it. But given my considerations about unintended consequences, one should be hesitant and not eager to engage in revisionism. And if there is a robust defense available for the traditional position, why not stick with it? We need more courage to be different from out culture, including our academic culture, and revisionism seems to be an easy way out that avoids the need for courage. And, in my view, the avoidance of revisionism nicely exemplifies the obedience and not the discussion mode of the scholarly life.

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### **ENDNOTES**

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Paul K. Moser, "Jesus and Philosophy: On The Questions We Ask," *Faith and Philosophy* 22 (July 2005): 261-83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Os Guinness, *The Gravedigger File* (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1983).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Charles Kraft, *Christianity with Power* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Servant Publications, 1989), p. 27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> J. Gresham Machen, address delivered on September 20, 1912, at the opening of the 101st session of Princeton Theological Seminary.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For the best historical treatment of the emergence of scientific naturalism in America, see Julie Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Cited in Dallas Willard, *Knowing Christ Today* (New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), p. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Thomas Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Cf. J. P. Moreland, "A Reluctant Traveler's Guide for Slouching Towards Theism: A Philosophical Note on Nagel's *Mind and Cosmos*," *Philosophia Christi* 14 (2012): 415-24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> J. Gresham Machen, *The Christian View of Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p. 159. <sup>9</sup> See John Cooper, *Body, Soul & Life Everlasting* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, rev. ed., 2000).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> N. T. Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), pp. 131-34, 190-206, 366-67, 424-26.

See Joel B. Green, *Body, Soul and Human Life* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 2008). Cf. John Cooper, "The Bible and Dualism Once Again," *Philosophia Christi* 9 (2007): 459-69; "The Current Body-Soul Debate: A Case for Holistic Dualism," *Southern Baptist Journal of Theology* 13 (2009): 32-50; "Exaggerated Rumors of Dualism's Demise," *Philosophia Christi* 11 (2009): 453-64.

Nancey Murphy, "Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues," in Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy and H. Newton Malony, *Whatever Happened to the Soul?* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), p. 17. Cf. pp. 13, 27, 139-143; cf. Nancey Murphy, *Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?* (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Nancey Murphy, "Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues," p. 18.
 See J. P. Moreland, Scott Rae, *Body and Soul* (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity

Press, 2000), chapters 1-6; J. P. Moreland, "Substance Dualism and the Argument from Self-Awareness," *Philosophia Christi* 13:1 (Summer 2011): 21-34; "A Conceptualist Argument for Substance Dualism," *Religious Studies* (April 2012): 1-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> John H. Hick, *Death & Eternal Life* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 92.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/neuroscience-underattack.html? r=3& In their otherwise excellent books, Curt Thompson and Ken Wilson are guilty of precisely this use of neuroscience. See Curt Thompson, *Anatomy of the Soul* (Carrollton, Texas: Tyndale, 2010); Ken Wilson, *Mystically Wired* (Nashville, Tennessee: Thomas Nelson, 2009). While clearly unintended, the neuroscientism

implicit in these books contributes to the undermining of the cognitive authority of spiritual formative theology. One wonders how the great Christian mystics throughout church history did what they did without the aid of neuroscience!